

855. J. E. Dugand, *Chypre et Cana'an*, Nice 1973 [Mimeographed dissertation] — — — reviews: *Kratylos* 19 (1974), pp. 85—88 (by R. Schmitt); *Paideia* 29 (1974), pp. 351 f (by V. Pisani.)

856. G. Neumann, *Beiträge zum Kyprischen. III. 4. Die Namen am Anfang ICS 311. 5. Der PN mask. Εὐμῖλος in ICS 340, Kadmos* 15 (1976), pp. 171—175.

COMPTES — RENDUS

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SECOND TURKISH SIEGE *

The literature on the siege of Vienna by the Grand Vezir Kara Mustafa Pasha and its relief by the Christian troops is immense¹. Among this mass of various publications there is a great number of contemporary prints and source records, as well as of scientific books and articles for the general public, and even literary works. A strong impulse towards starting a series of comprehensive investigations into the history of this armed Turkish-Austrian conflict was given, now nearly a century ago, by the approaching bi-centenary jubilee of the victory of Vienna on 12 September 1683². A new revival of interest marked the 250th anniversary in 1933³.

In the incessant flow of further publications⁴ a novel approach to the subject was started by the issuing of the book: *Kara Mustafa vor Wien* by the distinguished Viennese orientalist Richard F. Kreutel

*Some remarks on the book: *Double Eagle and Crescent. Vienna's Second Turkish Siege and Its Historical Setting*, by Thomas M. Barker. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1967. XVIII + 447 pages. Illus. Index. \$ 15.00.

¹ 3184 publications until 1954, as reckoned by W. Sturminger, *Bibliographie und Ikonographie der Türkenbelagerungen Wiens 1529 und 1683*, Graz—Köln, 1955, pp. 60—333. The list was further completed by O. Forst de Battaglia in his review of this book in „Deutsche Literaturzeitung”, vol. 78 (1957), pp. 423—426.

² Sturminger, p. 415 reckoned that c. 450 publications were issued in 1883.

³ Sturminger, p. 416: 176 publications.

⁴ Sturminger, *ibid.* cites c. 160 publications for the period 1933—1954.

(1955)⁵. It includes the translation of two Ottoman sources. The basis is the as far unpublished work known as *Vekayi-i Beg*, i.e. „Occurrences connected with Vienna”, probably by the Master of Ceremonies of the Sultan's court. It records the events commencing from 21 January 1683, and winding up with the Austrian unsuccessful endeavours to capture Buda in 1684. Thus, there is a diary of the Turkish troops marching to Vienna and of their siege, with two gaps: 14—18 August and 5—7 September, the account of the battle of 12 September and deliberations on the cause of the defeat of the Turks, the description of their retreat and of the strangling of Kara Mustafa at Belgrade on Christmas Day in 1683. These records coming from an eye-witness, but often presented under a different light and enriched with additional information, were incorporated into the work by Mehmed Ağa of Findikli near Istanbul, at that time a courtier of Mehmed IV's, known as the *Silâhdar*, i.e., weapons-bearer because of the function performed by him since 1703 at the court of Sultan Ahmed II. *Silâhdar* is the author of a great panoramic work on Turkish history from 1654 to 1720. A part of his work, referring to the period until 1695, was published in Istanbul in 1928 under the title „The History of *Silâhdar*”⁶. Kreutel adopted as basis for his publication the *Vekayi-i Beg*, adding to these records excerpts from the „History of *Silâhdar*”, derived from the excellent Viennese manuscript, overlooked by the Turkish editor of this work. He restricted himself, however, to the description of the siege of Vienna (beginning from 10 July), of the battle itself and to the said deliberations, adding thereto only the description of the execution of Kara Mustafa (NB. this happened on a Saturday, not on a Sunday, as recorded in Kreutel's book). This was followed by further works by R. F. Kreutel on 1683 and, more particularly, on other oriental sources to its history⁷; yet this first work, *Kara Mustafa*

⁵ *Kara Mustafa vor Wien. Das türkische Tagebuch der Belagerung Wiens, verfaßt vom Zeremonienmeister der Hohen Pforte. Übersetzt, eingeleitet und erklärt von Richard F. Kreutel, Graz—Wien—Köln, 1955, 194 pp. and 1 plate. The book was reprinted several times, and was translated into Turkish (sic!): Devlet-i Aliyye teşrifatçıbaşı Ahmet ağa, Viyana kuşatması günlüğü. Çeviren, düzenleyen, açıklayan: Richard F. Kreutel. Türkçesi: Esat Nermi, [Istanbul], 1970.*

⁶ *Silâhdâr Fındıklılı Mehmed ağa, Silâhdâr ta'rihi*, vol. I—II, XXI+765 and 807 pp. The second part of this author's work, known as the „Book of Victories”, was published in the new (i.e. Latin) alphabet and under a simplified linguistic form: *Silâhdâr Fındıklılı Mehmet Ağa, Nusretname. Sadeleştirilen İsmet Parmaksızoğlu*, vol. I—II, 2+VI+421 and 2+473 pp., İstanbul, 1962—1969.

⁷ R. F. Kreutel, *Osmanische Berichte über Kara Mustafas Feldzug gegen Wien*, „Die Welt des Islams”, N. S. vol. XII, No. 4 (1969), pp. 196—227. — Idem, *Kara Mustafas Feldzug gegen Wien nach dem*

vor Wien, has been certainly the most important of all. The new translation of Turkish sources has stimulated a number of historians to reopen the discussion about 1683.

Of the forty-odd publications on this subject issued until 1954 in English⁸, only one was an original scholarly work (London, 1883)⁹. The next of this type was to be published as late as 1964: *The Siege of Vienna* by J. Stoye (London, 349 pages). The author's main basis were printed records, to which he added only those he could find in the British Museum. Hence, although the reviewers praised his vast historical background, abundance of detail and lively style, they also objected that „he failed to advance historical research on the problem”¹⁰. Th. M. Barker was in a more fortunate position. He spent more than a whole academic year in Vienna, worked some time in Paris, and went as far as Simancas (the effects of this expedition were, in his own words, modestly rewarding), and received some precious material from London. He had the aid and assistance of a number of persons in the matter of various foreign languages, and the ever obliging R. F. Kreutel sent him additional written information from the Turkish sources. True, he had not seen the archival records of the Hague; yet there is no doubt whatever that Th. M. Barker had at his disposal an impressive stock of material. His text is nearly twice as extensive as Stoye's, he could present the historical background with greater insight, penetrate deeper into the mind and motives of the protagonists on either side of the front in 1683 and bring to light some new facts. He had planned to produce and he actually did produce a work differently oriented than the book of his British predecessor („its viewpoints are substantively different from my own” — Preface, p. VIII).

Let us now try to check, on the example of a few fundamental issues to what end Th. M. Barker put the source records available, did he really, as he probably thought himself, penetrate to the very core of oriental sources, what conclusions he drew and what did the novelty of his opinions consist in.

1. In Chapter I: „The Habsburg Monarchy”, the author first

Tagebuch des Pfortendolmetschers A. Mavrokordatos, „Jahrbuch des Vereins für Geschichte der Stadt Wien”, vol. 27 (1971), pp. 47—82. — Idem, *Der Schädel des Kara Mustafa Pascha*, „Jahrbuch des Vereins für Geschichte der Stadt Wien”, vol. 32/33 (1976/77), pp. 63—77.

⁸ Sturminger, p. 418: 43 publications (No. 2759 is in German!).

⁹ H. E. Malden, *Vienna 1683. The History and Consequences of the Defeat of the Turks before Vienna September 12, 1683 by John Sobieski, King of Poland and Charles Leopold, Duke of Lorraine...*, London, 1883, VIII+122 pp. (cf. Sturminger, p. 213).

¹⁰ B. Królikowski in „Kwartalnik Historyczny”, vol. 74 (1967), No. 2, pp. 478—480.

concerns himself with the person of Leopold I. A century ago, an Austrian historian wrote about the Emperor that „the only feature which showed him a Habsburg was his big drooping underlip”¹¹. Th. M. Barker, after a detailed analyse of Leopold's I qualities and defects reaches the conclusion that „as a sovereign he could have been worse — and possibly a little better” (p. 10). He did not take into account the monograph on the Emperor by von Heigel which was certainly less biased than those written by the Emperor's contemporaries and panegyrists¹². Stoye had devoted to Leopold I incomparably less attention than Barker, yet his final conclusion: „...colourless, ... cautious, patient, weak, but sometimes unyielding”¹³ seems to be more pertinent, for Leopold I was actually just this, both as an Emperor and as individual, and it was this „unyielding” attitude, combined with a weak will, wavering character, and compliance to his advisors, inimical to Hungary, which has provoked the Hungarians to seek, as an act of despair, aid from the Porte.

As compared to the six pages of text dedicated to the Emperor (pp. 5—11), the tragedy of the Hungarians torn between two foreign invaders, and seeking refuge with the „infidels” against national, political, social and religious oppression on the part of their Christian brethren, was presented much too briefly and superficially (pp. 16—36). The Hungarian „rebels” were called not *kuroczok* (thus from p. 31 on), but *kuruczok* or *kurucok* (pl. from *kurucz*, *kuruc*). The term is dating earlier than from 1673 (p. 32): in this year it was only revived; derived from Latin *cruciatu*, it had sprung up during the antifeudal „crusade” of Hungarian peasants led by G. Dózsa (1514). Certainly, the Austrian authors of 1883 showed much more sympathy and understanding to the Hungarian plight of that time. Among the many quotations inserted in Barker's book, one rather misses a song popular with the *kuruc* „rebels”, which we find in the German translation in one of these 19th-century publications: „The German is tormenting us, the Turk is invading us, / With fire and sword he is devastating the land and the region. / But to bring the misfortunes which the godless German has brought down on us, / Neither Turk nor Tatar is capable; this he has not done!”¹⁴. This cry of an oppressed nation best reflects the motives of its armed revolt against the Habsburg and makes us consider the situation of Hungarians on their „Ottoman ruled territory” which

¹¹ V. von Renner, *Wien im Jahre 1683*, Vienna, 1883, p. 4.

¹² Th. K. von Heigel, *Neue Beiträge zur Charakteristik Leopolds I.* (1890). The book is cited in *Mayers Lexicon*, vol. VII (1927), p. 855, s. v. *Leopold*. Sturminger does not include this work in his list. To the present author it has been inaccessible.

¹³ Stoye, p. 54.

¹⁴ Renner, p. 14.

we find depicted in this book (pp. 16—17). In the history of Hungary under Ottoman rule we will find, apart from negative aspects, also „le phénomène bien connu d'une liberté spirituelle alors sans exemple hors de l'empire turc”, and even though these words have been uttered in recent times¹⁵, the fact itself has been since long „bien connu” and emphasized even by the Austrian authors of the eighteen eighties, whose works are quoted by Barker (p. 79)¹⁶.

Hence it can be hardly said that this issue, fundamental for the understanding of the Hungarian uprising under the command of E. Tököly, has been presented impartially or, at least, in an exhaustive manner.

2. The problems of the Ottoman Empire were treated by Barker with too little attention and rather superficially. Of the Muslim sources to the history of 1683 he knew only what had been comprised in R. F. Kreutel's *Kara Mustafa vor Wien*, while the information obtained from that eminent scholar by private correspondence could hardly exhaust all the complex and intricate questions involved.

The two main passages: „The Structure of the Ottoman Empire” (pp. 56—63) and „The Turks” included in Chapter VI: „The Opposing Armies” (pp. 187—97) would have surely gained more had their author have made recourse to the more recent publications. Marsigli's work, now a classic, is not free from errors and full of misprints¹⁷. Rycout is equally obsolete (cf. note II 54). The work by İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, mentioned obliquely in note II 59, is much too extensive for ready-

¹⁵ J. Aubin, in „Turcica”, vol. VIII/2 (1976), p. 274 (review of the book: *Fejezetek a török hódoltsági reformáció történetéből* [„Chapters on the History of Reformation During the Age of Turkish Rule”] by G. Kathona, Budapest, 1974. While noting the various manifestations of Ottoman tolerance, the reviewer records also, on the other hand „la simultanéité... d'un système de contrainte qui allait très vite accentuer les aspects négatifs de la civilisation ottomane”.

¹⁶ Renner, p. 15 winds up his remarks on the fairly bearable situation of Christians in the Ottoman ruled part of Hungary and the religious tolerance of the Turks, which led to numerous cases of Protestant clergymen escaping from the Habsburg governed part of Hungary to that in Turkish rule, as follows: „The Hungarians, and Hungarian Protestants in particular, did not, evidently, consider Turkish rule to be so terrible as it might seem to us”.

¹⁷ L. F. Marsigli, *Stato militare dell'Imperio Ottomano — L'état militaire de l'Empire Ottoman...*, The Hague, 1732. A new photo-offset edition with XXXIV pp. of the „Einführung” by M. Kramer and the „Register” (with many corrections) by R. F. Kreutel has been published in Graz, 1972; cf. the remarks by H. Wurm, in „Bibliotheca Orientalis”, vol. XXX (1973), pp. 492—494.

-reference use¹⁸. Turcologists have since long resorted for this purpose to the „Vocabulary of Ottoman historic expressions and terms” by M. Zeki Pakalın¹⁹. Th. M. Barker, who does not know Turkish, should have reverted to the excellent publication by two British scholars H. A. R. Gibbs and H. Bowen which, although dealing with the eighteenth century, provides a comprehensive introduction into the Turkish problems of the preceding age²⁰. Examples of errors in Turkish terms: Instead of *Kızlarağası*, *Kulkâhyası*, *Zağarcıbaşı* should be *kızlar ağası*, *kul kâhyası* and *zağarcı başı*. „Hashis” cited in p. 64 does not mean *Kadın* (the correct spelling is *kadın*), but rather *hasseki*²¹, and the word *odalisques* on the same page calls for an explanation that this is a Turkish word: *odalık*. The Grand Vezir as commander in chief of the expedition had the title of *serdâr* „chief; commander in chief” (Persian); the Turkish authors use the title *serdâr-ı ekrem* „the most noble commander in chief”. The Persian-Arabian title *ser’asker* „chief of the army” was applied to the commanders of smaller units, delegated by the *serdâr*. Too much space would be needed to correct and complete the author’s statements concerning the organization of the Turkish army.

Another passage giving rise to objections is the „Ottoman Politic 1658—1679” (pp. 63—72). Mehmed IV ascended to the throne when he was 6 years and 7 months old²², and not as a ten-year old; the description of his personality (pp. 63—65) is incomplete. Both in this passage (p. 64) and sketching Kara Mustafa’s personality (p. 70) the author comments at large on their excesses at the harem and at the festive tables. I think it would be more to the point to record how Kara Mustafa, to conceal his own errors of judgement, twice sentenced

¹⁸ The title, not cited in Barker’s book, is: *Osmanlı Devleti teşkilâtından kapukulu ocakları* [„From the Organization of the Ottoman Empire: The Corps of the *kapu kulu*”], vol. I—II, XVI+755 and X+366 pp. and 44 tables, Ankara, 1943—1944.

¹⁹ M. Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı tarih deyimleri ve terimleri sözlüğü*, vol. I—III, İstanbul, 1946—1955.

²⁰ H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West. A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization and Modern Culture in the Near East*. Vol. I: *Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century*, parts 1 and 2. London etc., 1950—1957.

²¹ On the term *hasseki* cf. A. D. Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty*, Oxford, 1956, p. 112 (here *haseki* according to the new Turkish spelling). — As regards the title of *ser’asker*, during this expedition it belonged to Ibrahim Pasha of Buda. Cf. Kreutel, *Kara Mustafa vor Wien*, pp. 130 (n. 44) and 192.

²² Alderson, table XXXVIII.

to death his servants²³. As regards lasciviousness, although Leopold I himself was quite the opposition of the Sultan under this respect, his court was thoroughly depraved, and there are no great grounds to upbraid the Turks²⁴. The Venetian complaints against the intrigues and atheism of Kara Mustafa (p. 70) scarcely can be treated seriously. The suggestion that Kara Mustafa was „the offspring of a fruit peddler from a humble village of Anatolia” (p. 69), recorded by the Venetian bailo G. B. Donado, seems controversial²⁵. Ottoman policy has been presented in too sketchy a way. One small passage is only devoted to France, and the arguments presented are far from conclusive. The war for Crete, the wars against Muscovy and Poland are presented in a few words. There is no mention whatever of England, Holland, Ragusa or of the Turkish economy or financial situation²⁶.

²³ G. F. Abbott, *Under the Turk in Constantinople. A Record of Sir John Finche’s Embassy 1674—1681*, London, 1920, pp. 322, 325.

²⁴ „Padre d’Aviano... lamented the heavy sins of the court and city of Vienna [...]; the heavy depravity of the city and court”, wrote Jan III Sobieski to his wife in the letter of 21 September 1683. *Akta do dziejów króla Jana IIIgo sprawy roku 1683o* [...] wyjaśniające, ed. F. Kluczycki, Kraków, 1883, p. 415. These *Akta* had been studied by Barker.

²⁵ A. Benetti, *Viaggi a Costantinopoli di Gio. Battista Donado* [...], vol. II, Venezia, 1688, p. 37 also calls Kara Mustafa „filio d’un mulattiere, che d’Asia veniva a vender frutta alla Città”. „A fruit peddler”: this is how the Grand Vezir himself was called by the 17th-century Armenian author Eremya Çelebi. Cf. H. D. Andreasyan, *Eremya Çelebi’nin yangınlar tarihi* [„History of the Fires, by E. Ç.” (Turkish translation)], „İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi”, vol. 27 (1973), p. 81 (Turkish: *manav*). According to Professor A. Tietze, to whom I am greatly indebted for this remark, the word *manav* might have also meant „peasant” in the seventeenth century. Hence, there would be no contradiction, if we were to compare the above with the other sources on Kara Mustafa’s descent. The Venetians, as it seems, did not know this meaning of the Turkish word.

²⁶ The situation of the French Ambassador de Nointel in Istanbul was discussed by A. Vandal, *L’odyssée d’un ambassadeur. Les voyages du marquis de Nointel 1670—1680*, Paris, 1900, pp. 225—230. On the relations between Kara Mustafa and the English Ambassador Sir J. Finch and his successor to this post Lord Chandos cf. Abbott, cf. *op. cit.* Both books contain a vast number of observation on the relations of the Porte with other countries: Venice, Genoa, Ragusa, the Empire, Poland, Muscovy, with special reference to the manner in which Kara Mustafa was treating their diplomatic representatives. Cf. also: N. A. Smirnov, *Rossiia i Turciya v XVI—XVII vv.* [„Russia

The position of Kara Mustafa as the actual steersman at the helm of the Ottoman State since 1676, and the real motives for his attack against the Austrians in 1683 were given too little consideration in this book. Between the lines of the Turkish sources we can find also more complex and subtle motives apart from mere greed referred to (rightly, of course) by Barker (p. 150). This greed was partly the result of the necessity to patch up the deep holes in the Porte's pockets, holes that had been „burnt out” by Kara Mustafa's predecessor, Köprülüzade Ahmed, chiefly by his wartime exploits. So it happened that Kara Mustafa, a man derided for his rustic manners, was made to pay by a strenuous war and disadvantageous treaty with Muscovy, and later with a shattering defeat at Vienna, his death and infamy for the lightheartedness, lack of political acumen and a too easy victory over Poland won by Ahmed Pasha, glorified till the present day by the Arabic attributive adjective of *Fâzîl* „Learned, Excellent, Fine”...

The reported rumours alleging that Kara Mustafa „intended to carve out a realm of his own in the West” were rightly rejected by Barker (p. 71). From the Silâhdar's chronicle it can be clearly seen that he did not intend to give up his post of Grand Vezir and after Vienna he proposed to win the wealthy Republic of Venice²⁷. Of the history of his expedition of 1683 I shall indicate just a couple of minor points which in the light of Muslim sources have a different aspect from their presentation in Barker's book. On p. 71 Barker critically discusses several contemporary sources which claimed „that Kara Mustafa strove to take Vienna intact, by means of a capitulation

and Turkey in the 16th—17th cent.”], especially vol. II, Moskva, 1946, pp. 165—167, where the Turkish-Russian war over Ukraine 1677—78 and the ensuing peace of 1681 are discussed. Of the more recent publications, mention might be made of: M. S. Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı-İngiliz iktisadî münasebetleri* [„Ottoman-English economic relations”], vol. I (1580—1838), Ankara, 1974 and G. Erdbrink, *Onyedinci asırda Osmanlı-Holanda münasebetlerine bir bakış* [„A Glimpse at the Ottoman-Dutch Relations in the 17th cent.”], „Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi”, vol. II—III (1973—74), pp. 159—180. On Polish-Turkish affairs cf. below.

²⁷ *Kara Mustafa pod Wiedniem. Źródła muzułmańskie do dziejów wyprawy wiedeńskiej 1683 roku.* Z tureckiego przełożył i opracował [„Kara Mustafa at the Siege of Vienna. Muslim sources to the Vienna Expedition of 1683. Translated from Turkish and Edited by] Z. Abrahamowicz, Kraków 1973, pp. 35—210 contains the translation of the notes made by that author from 21 January 1681 to 28 February 1684, i.e., commencing with the account on the Porte's affairs with Muscovy and ending up with information on the seizure of the estate left after the strangling of the Grand Vezir Kara Mustafa.

rather than by a general storm”, for in that latter „the troops would have enjoyed the right of plunder”. The author's conclusion that this piece of information is „highly dubious” as „there is no confirmation in Turkish sources” (note VIII 78) seems rather preposterous. This information is confirmed by the Crimean historian Mehmed Gerey²⁸. Mehmed Gerey, who strongly disliked Kara Mustafa for his contemptuous attitude to the Tatars during the expedition, goes on to describe, how the Grand Vezir had won the hatred both of his own troops and of the Tatars. The Turkish-Tatar controversies at Vienna were presented by Barker without a proper historical background, even though the problem is a highly interesting one and there is no lack of information on the subject in the European languages²⁹. The Turkish source records contain a number of relevant data on the attitude adopted by Mehmed IV towards his Grand Vezir after the latter's allegedly self-willed attack on Vienna. Thus, for instance, among the surviving records there is the list of meat articles sent by the Sultan to the Grand Vezir to Vienna for the approaching Bayram, a point of minor importance, but how typical!³⁰ On p. 374 Barker writes that after the defeat Kara Mustafa sent to the Padishah „the *Telhîşî* (Court Messenger) İsmail Aga..., probably with a personal letter”. This Aga's name appears just this once, although he had been sent on similar missions from Vienna before. His title *telhîşî* or *telhîşci* (and not *telhîşî*)

²⁸ *Ta'rih-i Mehmed Gerey*. MS. of the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna, No. H. O. 86, vol. 3v—4r. On this author and his work, cf. Kreutel, *Osmanische Berichte...*, p. 219 (the author does not refer to the text after fol. 6v). Cf. Abrahamowicz, pp. 25—27 and 307—322: Polish translation of the part of this *Ta'rih* which has a bearing on the Vienna expedition and the ensuing occurrences among the Tatars (up to fol. 12r of the MS.).

²⁹ It is enough to refer to the highly derogative opinion on the Tatars in the anonymous Ottoman *Naşihatnâme* [„The Book of Advice”], published in a German translation by W. F. A. Behrnauer, „Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft”, vol. XVIII (1864), p. 724. To the question „Turks and Tatars” is devoted Chapter of a book by B. Lewis, *Islam in History. Ideas, Men and Events in the Middle East*, La Sa'le, Ill., 1973 (regrettably, it has been inaccessible to the present author).

³⁰ This list was published, along with some other interesting accounts of the Ottoman court during the 1683 expedition, by L. Fekete, *Die Siyâqat-Schrift in der türkischen Finanzverwaltung*, vol. I, Budapest, 1955, pp. 802—803 (Turkish text with translation). Cf. on the subject Abrahamowicz, p. 29. This was probably the „deceitful bag of gifts from Yusuf aga” i.e., the *kızlar ağısı*, of which there is mention in *Silâhdâr ta'rihi*, vol. II p. 106 (cf. the translation in: Abrahamowicz, p. 186).

is derived from *telhīs* „report, abstract [of state affairs]”, submitted by the Grand Vezir to his sovereign through the intermediary of this very courtier³¹. Silāhdār relates the content of that *telhīs*³², then proceeding to comment on the intrigues of the Grand Vezir's enemies in Belgrade which the Vezir hoped to foil by sending to the Sultan as many gifts as he could afford after his defeat³³.

We wish to emphasize that to the author's credit should be put his impartial approach to the description of the manner in which the Turkish invaders were waging war in Austria. Th. M. Barker, fully aware of the cruelties during the Thirty Years' War between Christians, is far from condemning the Muslim for their methods. He knew well the critical utterances made by the Master of Ceremonies and Silāhdār on the subject. A more energetic protest against the excesses of Muslim soldiers at Vienna and some striking examples of their offences and dissolution are to be found in Cebeci Hasan Esirī's highly original records of this campaign³⁴.

3. Evidently, we can hardly omit to discuss Barker's approach to the role played by King Jan III Sobieski and his troops in this campaign. This is, for Polish historians, a most vital issue, since the part of the Polish King and his army have been the object of numerous attacks by Austrian and German historians. C. Clausewitz, a man widely competent in the problem of war, wrote: „There is no other strategist's career which would be richer in deeds of splendid courage and admirable perseverance than Sobieski's”³⁵. K. Toifel, by far not an un-critical admirer of the Poles, admitted that their share in the relief of Vienna „by itself will suffice to adorn their name for ever with the admiration of the generations to come”³⁶. O. Klopp's attitude to the problem was quite different³⁷. J. Newald, although apparently

³¹ Gibb and Bowen, vol. I, part 1, p. 364. S. Faroghi, *Das Großwesir-telhīs: eine aktenkundliche Studie*, „Der Islam”, vol. XLV (1969), pp. 96—116.

³² *Silāhdār ta'rīhī*, vol. II, p. 117 and translation: Abrahamowicz, p. 199.

³³ *Silāhdār ta'rīhī*, vol. II, p. 120 and translation: Abrahamowicz, p. 203.

³⁴ On this author and his work cf. Kreutel, *Osmanische Berichte*, p. 212 and Abrahamowicz, p. 18—20 and 213—235 (Polish translations of Esirī's [„The Captive's”, because he had spent many years in Christian captivity] memoirs).

³⁵ *Hinterlassene Werke* des Generals Carl von Clausewitz über *Krieg und Kriegführung*, vol. X, Berlin, 1837, p. 7.

³⁶ K. Toifel, *Die Türken vor Wien im Jahre 1683. Ein österreichisches Gedenkbuch*, Prag—Leipzig, 1883, p. 525.

³⁷ O. Klopp, *Das Jahr 1683 und der folgende Türkenkrieg bis zum Frieden von Karlowitz 1699*, Graz 1882.

objecting to Klopp's charges against the King, finally reaches the conclusion that the Polish contribution to the victory at Vienna was dubious³⁸. Newald maintained that „The glory of that day [of the Battle of Vienna] was due to the Archduke of Lorraine” only³⁹. In fact, the thing that he, and many others as well, resented most was that Jan III had taken hold „of the contents of the Grand Vezir's tent, valued at many million worth”⁴⁰. Half a century later, E. Czegka declared that „Sobieski was a thoroughly Oriental warrior: personally brave, but lusting for glory and over-fond of fame, for whom booty was a gauge of victory”⁴¹. The „unabashed truth” was revealed on 1 September 1939 in the Viennese supplement to the central organ of the NSDAP (both the date and the paper are most significant...) by a man not less bold than modest, for he signed only with his initials „Dr. W. B.”, in his article: „How was it really with Sobieski? The King of Poland liberated Vienna from — 4 million guildens”⁴².

We do not know how these „chivalrous” steps undertaken on his behalf against the fame-seeking Polish King would have been received by Charles V Duke of Lorraine, this noble knight commanding the troops of the Emperor and of the German Electors in their wars against the Turks from 1683 to 1690. We know, on the other hand, the answer of the Polish scholar who had a sober approach to Jan III and did not spare him words of criticism⁴³. Barker expresses his approval of this book (p. 387) and realizes fully how partial are some publications in German. His opinion on Sobieski is fairly appreciative; defending him often against his slanderers, he was just and fair in depicting the Polish contribution to the victory. But he was surprisingly unequal in the appraisal of different persons: it seems strange, too, that he

³⁸ J. Newald, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Belagerung von Wien durch die Türken im Jahre 1683. Historische Studien*, Wien, 1883, pp. 64, 76, 208—214.

³⁹ Newald, p. 212.

⁴⁰ Newald, p. 214.

⁴¹ E. Czegka, *Die weltgeschichtliche Bedeutung des Jahres 1683, „Militärwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen”*, vol. LXIV (1933), p. 651.

⁴² Sturminger, p. 68, No. 684, cites: „B., Dr. W., Wie war es eigentlich mit Sobieski? Der Polenkönig hat Wien von — 4 Millionen Gulden befreit. In: Wiener Beobachter, Beilage des „Völkischer Beobachters” v. 1. 9. 1939”.

⁴³ O. Forst de Battaglia, *Jan Sobieski, König von Polen*, Einsiedeln—Zürich, 1946. Barker knows also some older Polish publications on 1683 and not to all of them his approach is critical. He overlooked the study on the origin of the Polish-Austrian treaty of 1683: K. Konarski, *Polska przed odsieczą wiedeńską r. 1683* [„Poland before the relief of Vienna in 1683”], Warszawa, 1914, VI+234 pp.; cf. Sturminger, p. 188, No. 1770.

overlooked certain vital information in the sources. Nor can one easily agree to the two conclusions which are the leitmotif of his work. Both refer to King Jan III Sobieski: to his attitude and his assessment in the 1683 historiography.

Barker imputes to the King making „invidious remarks” about the garb of Lorraine and the Elector of Saxony (p. 46). This is simply a misunderstanding. On the contrary, the King was surprised at the relative poverty of their attire and military outfit. Furthermore, Barker seems not to notice the high appreciation Sobieski had of Lorraine's personality traits, of his skill as strategist and of the high efficiency of the Teuton troops in general. The King expressed his „extraordinary contentment” with Lorraine⁴⁴.

On p. 339 there is mention that after the battle „Sobieski forbade all but the lightest pursuit” of the Turks. Nevertheless, the pursuit undertaken by the Polish and Imperial units together, proved most successful⁴⁵. Barker considers here the question why the King, in spite of Lorraine's instigation, did not engage in a general pursuit in the evening hours after the battle. The King accounted for it, among other reasons, by pointing out that his men were tired. Barker comments that the fatigue did not prevent the Poles „to pick over the enemy camp”.

The Polish troops were really tired after the strenuous march to the battlefield and the ensuing struggle with the enemy ranks who had still kept their strength. The Poles, unlike the Teutons who had for a long time passively awaited their arrival were not allowed to take a respite. It should be borne in mind, too, that in the Polish wing the Ottomans were feverishly withstanding the attack, and even „when retreating they keenly defend themselves, *et font la plus belle retraite du monde*”, as the King wrote to his wife. Much time and effort was needed to overcome the enemy camp, for the King was fearing a trap (a fact well known also to Turkish chroniclers), perhaps by analogy to the battle of Khotin in 1673, when, as he writes in a letter of that period, „men as brave as this Turkish army, have not been known in ages; and even after reaching the camp, we have been twice close to defeat”⁴⁶.

⁴⁴ *Akta*, pp. 331, 359—360.

⁴⁵ Toifel, p. 489—490.

⁴⁶ A. Grabowski, *Ojczyście spominki* [„Contributions to Native History”], vol. II, Kraków, 1845, p. 354 (Sobieski's letter from 11 November 1673). *Akta*, p. 378 (Sobieski's letter to his wife from 13 September 1683). Abrahamowicz, p. 229 (translation of the account on the final hours of the battle of Vienna after Cebeci Hasan Esirî) and p. 257 (translation of the description of these events by Hüseyin Hezârfenn; on this author and his work cf. Kreutel, *Osmanische Berichte*, p. 214 and the exhaustive study by H. Wurm, *Der osmanische Historiker*

As regards booty, the matter is again not so simple. Count Taaffe was not a Pole, he entered the Turkish camp with the German-speaking troops. Now, in his letter to the Governor of the Spanish Netherlands, written in the Grand Vezir's camp at midnight, after the battle, when reporting the victory he adds that he is sending him „a very small present”: „some of our plunder from the Turks”⁴⁷. As we see, the Poles were by far not the only ones to plunder the Turkish camp: a feverish greed at the sight of the abandoned treasures and splendours overcame all those who had the „luck” to invade it before the others. The rich tents of the Grand Vezir would have been taken by any commander in chief, his camp's conqueror. It had been always „customary” to look for plunder in the defeated enemy's camp, and certainly this was not a Polish peculiarity. The ways of war looting resorted to by the victorious troops in this particular war, can be best illustrated by the scenes which had taken place at Buda after its „liberation” in 1686, when there were but few Poles among the „liberators”, and the whole city was laid in ashes⁴⁸. It must be borne in mind, moreover, that Sobieski did not grudge gifts, out of the booty captured at his life's risk, to other Princes and even the Emperor himself received his share⁴⁹. Thus the callous objections raised against the Polish King because of the booty seem to be but a common regret of the descendants of those who had preferred to stand and wait until Sobieski with his son entered the battle, a regret that not all the walnuts taken out from the fire by Sobieski went to them...

Later (p. 338) we read that „John III allowed his vanity and need for domestic political prestige to get the better of him before the day was out”. This is meant to imply that Sobieski tactlessly, without awaiting the Emperor's arrival, was the first to enter Vienna on the morrow of the victory, that he sang the „Te Deum” at the Solemn High Mass and was enthusiastically acclaimed by the population, which led to misunderstandings with the Emperor.

Stoye had not been surprised that the King felt to be an instrument in God's hand and that it was to God, before the Emperor, that his first tribute was given⁵⁰. If this, too, is to be treated as a manifestation of the Polish King's „vanity”, then also the Imperial approach to the question should have been shown. On 13 September Leopold I wrote

Hüseyin b. Ga'fer, genannt Hezârfenn, und die Istanbuler Gesellschaft in der zweiten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1971, particularly pp. 115—120).

⁴⁷ *Akta*, p. 370.

⁴⁸ The last to describe this historic event was L. Fekete, *La vie à Budapest sous la domination turque, 1541—1686*, „Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale”, vol. III/3 (1964), pp. 546—547.

⁴⁹ *Akta*, pp. 396, 411.

⁵⁰ Stoye, p. 266.

thus to Padre M. d'Aviano: „And this is true[:] I have ordered that I be the first to enter the city, for it seemed to me that otherwise the love of my subjects to me might diminish, while to others it might grow". The Emperor does not want to forbid anything to anybody (he does not specify, to whom or what), he just wishes that „on arriving my vassals could see my person a little" ⁵¹. Is this not more than the „vanity" imputed to Sobieski? And why was this motive in the Emperor's behaviour omitted from discussion?

On pp. 339—40 we read that Sobieski was equally guilty of failing to order the pursuit also on 13 September, while further delay was caused by the Austrians. We will see the whole problem under a different light when we consider that John George of Anhalt wrote thus to the Elector of Brandenburg, already on 13 September: „Tomorrow or the day after his Imperial Majesty is expected here, and it will be resolved what should be done further with this pretty *armée*" ⁵².

Sobieski ordered that his letter to the Queen dated 13 September, with the description of his victory and booty, as well as the honors he had been given by the Electors and their troops and by the population of Vienna, be made public by printing it in the „gazettes". In his letters to the Pope and several European sovereigns the King, writing about the victory, did not refer to the Austrian and German commanders who aided him to defeat the Turks. Barker terms it a „publicity effort" (p. 340). The statement that „the Polish ruler has often been depicted, largely because of his own publicity efforts, as the saviour of Christianity [...] without much credit being given to anyone else" is to be found in the third sentence of the Preface, and then the author goes on to express his regret that the scarce number of publications on 1683 in English „was marred not only by varying degrees of Polish nationalist bias but also by contradictions" (p. VII). Any author has the right to think that he has shed the errors of his predecessor and had reached the core of the matter. However, we can find in Barker's arguments, if not inner contradictions, then at least some gaps. And this amounts to misinterpretation.

A number of congratulations for the victory, worded in flowery style, were forwarded also to the Emperor, and still more to Lorraine ⁵³. It can be assumed that these were, partly at least, answers to their letters reporting the victory. But even if the „publicity efforts" undertaken by the King of Poland had no counterpart, they did not outshine the fame of King's partners. As regards the request to his wife asking her to publish his letter in the „gazettes", the historians have no difficulty to understand the impartial motives of this measure

⁵¹ *Akta*, p. 385.

⁵² *Akta*, p. 384.

⁵³ Stoye, pp. 267—268.

and are able to observe that the King was not the only man to have written about his victory ⁵⁴. In his letter to the Elector of Brandenburg dated 13 September John George of Anhalt writes: „The King of Poland was commanding *en chef* and was where only the fire was at its strongest; in the turmoil of battle he sent six companies of hussars to the Duke of Lorraine at the left wing", and he adds, „I must testify *sans flatterie* to the King and his commanders that" — like the commanders of German nationality mentioned by him — „they were always *à la teste de l'armée* and that everything went on without a single *confusion* or *désordre*". And further on: „This morning the King sent wild Tatars and a certain number of *towarische* in pursuit after the Turks". He repeats the King's compliments to all the victorious troops, and in his description of what the King had done on this day we do not find anything that might have offended him ⁵⁵. Not to mention the congratulations submitted to the King after the battle by the other commanders referred to in Sobieski's letter to his wife, we must remember that as early as 13 September he was thanked and praised for his victory by Emperor Leopold I himself ⁵⁶.

Should, however, even these statements, from the King's contemporaries and his co-participants in this war and up to C. Clausewitz, be not enough to admit that Sobieski owed his fame not just to his own „publicity efforts", but above all to his efforts as a soldier and commander in the war against Turks in the past years and in 1683, we might listen to a Turkish historian:

„And the King of Poland came [to Vienna] in his own person, having, apart from other troops, sixteen thousand of iron-clad horsemen. The fact that, as already mentioned, he at first drove his horse against the Muslim and drew his sword at them at Vienna, and the following year, during the siege of Ujvár and the events of Parkany, he did so much wrong, for more than anybody else he gave his aid and support [to the Austrians] as well as took many Muslim prisoners (he even took prisoner and carried to his own country the Vezir Mustafa Pasha, who at the beginning of his career was a *bostancı*), is known to everybody".

The author of the above passage, Cebeci Hasan Esirî ⁵⁷, does not mention any other Christian commander. The few small inexactitudes cannot diminish the intrinsic value of the testimony given by this man who indeed could not be concerned with showering praise on any of those who had routed the Turks in 1683. When writing on the very

⁵⁴ Stoye, p. 267.

⁵⁵ *Akta*, pp. 382—385. Stoye, p. 267.

⁵⁶ *Akta*, p. 386.

⁵⁷ Abrahamowicz, p. 231 (the Turkish text is to be found in „Ta'rih-i 'Osmānī Encümeni Mecmū'ası", vol. III (1912), p. 1016).

special part of King Jan III of Poland in these events, the Turkish author (I hope all would agree) certainly was not marred by the „publicity efforts” of the King himself, or by the „Polish nationalist bias” in the Western historiography.

On the *anti*-Polish nationalistic attitude of the authors cited above and many others writing on the events of 1683 the American reader, not conversant with these problems, will not be able to learn anything from Th. M. Barker's book.

4. In his summing up („The Siege in Historical Perspective”), Barker considers the reasons of Kara Mustafa's defeat (p. 374). The general inferiority of the Turkish army as set against the Western armies of that time, combined with the Grand Vezir's incompetence as a field commander were, no doubt, the two main and conclusive reasons. It might be wondered, however, whether the most important defect which ultimately led to the utmost failure of the expedition was not Kara Mustafa's unsatisfactory knowledge of the complex political system in West Europe. Thus, on the one hand, he put a rather naive trust in the visions by which Tököly was tempting him, while on the other he underestimated and failed to take into due account all the sensible warnings, such as when Khan Murad Gerey was trying to put him on his guard against the approaching King of Poland⁵⁸. Kara Mustafa, the continuator of the perennial Ottoman policy of territorial expansion, also in this point reverted to the models set forth by his predecessors, who, out of past experience, beforehand had rejected the possibility of any consolidation of the West in order to counter their common threat from the Turks⁵⁹.

Discussing the outcome of the Turkish defeat at Vienna in 1683 and of the other defeats that followed, up to the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, Barker sees, above all, Austria's transformation into a great power in external affairs, coupled with the „tranquil internal growth”

⁵⁸ Abrahamowicz, p. 312 (the account of Mehmed Gerey, which must be compared with those of the Master of Ceremonies and Silahdar in Kreutel, *Kara Mustafa von Wien*, p. 153, 160, 163 and Abrahamowicz, p. 155, 157—158.

⁵⁹ Cf. the answer of the Grand Vezir Köprülü Mehmed Pasha to the Imperial resident Reninger's threats of an European alliance, cited by J. von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. VI, Pest, 1830, p. 88.

As an initiation to the general problems connected with the second Turkish siege of Vienna highly recommendable seems H. G. Majer's study *Die Türken — Gegner des Westens am Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts*, in: *Kurfürst Max Emanuel. Bayern und Europa um 1700*, vol. I: *Zur Geschichte und Kunstgeschichte der Max-Emanuel-Zeit*, ed. H. Glaser, München, 1976, pp. 362—372.

of its nations (p. 374). As regards the situation of the nations inhabiting the Habsburg Empire, the „growth” was incontestable, but it was never „tranquil”. At the very dawn of the next century, in 1703, there came a new great uprising of Hungarians „liberated” by the Habsburg. Indeed, we would look in vain for any period of tranquility in Hungary under Habsburg rule. And there were, of course, many other examples of dissatisfaction and armed revolt. What were the responses encountered among the „liberated” nations evoked by the Imperial policy of „liberating” them from under Ottoman oppression, was to be proved by the certainly not „tranquil” events at Sarajevo on 28 June 1914...

Th. M. Barker's book reached Poland with a long delay. It will be of great interest to Polish historians and certainly will have an appraisal much more extensive than mine, in which I had of necessity to restrict myself to some problems only. My principal objective was to stress that in publications on subjects of this kind, Turkish affairs cannot be treated in a marginal way, with the omission of Turkish (or generally Muslim) sources, and still less, of the achievements of orientalists in this field. It is further to be regretted, I think, that Th. M. Barker, an American scholar, has entangled himself and has involved the American addressees of his book into the old Teutonic-Polish controversy on the share of Poland in the 1683 victory at Vienna, and that he did not try to solve it in a conclusive way. There is room enough in the chariot of fame and glory for all those who in 1683 had repulsed the Turks from Vienna and Hungary, and no serious researcher in this country will ever try to diminish the role and contribution of the non-Polish commanders in this campaign. As regards nationalism, again I would like to stress that the author should have shown the American reading public the keen edge of *anti*-Polish nationalism, which has recurrently revealed itself within the international discussion on 1683. By his two inconsiderate comments in the Preface Th. M. Barker has rather spoilt the general favorable impression. To misquote after him: „So little was needed to make his book much better...”

This is serious matter. In three years' time the descendants of those who have fought in 1683, victors and vanquished alike, will have to face the three-centenary Jubilee of the Battle. Will the conflict about those memorable events go on, even among the victors? The American scholar of whom a more aloof, unbiased approach might have been expected, has not brought the longed-for olive-branch. And this is a pity.