

of folk literature and legends. The extensive classical and formal literature at times has drawn heavily on popular sources; suffice to mention only Kalila va Dimna, Marzban Nameh, Tuti-Nameh, Sinbad Nameh, Layla va Majnun, Khusrow va Shirin etc. During the long and cold winter nights these stories were read and retold century after century in Iran. In the contemporary Persian literature the interplay between the popular and the formal is even more observable, as the writers try to reflect the social changes of the country in their writing. Let us hope that the rapid changes in Iran will not eliminate certain traditional forms of artistic expression like Roohowzi, thus allowing the principles of homeostasis to be at work.

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RELIGION AND POLITICS IN IRAN:
THE FADĀ'İYĀN ISLĀM *

Origin and Development

Religion and religious issues have always had a significant impact on politics in modern Iran. On many occasions religious issues have been responsible for violent confrontations with the government. At other times the support of the established religious hierarchy has made political victory possible for secular groups and organizations. In post World War II Iran, several religious organizations and parties emerged and played important roles in the political arena. Among these, the Fadā'iyān-i Islām (The Devotees of Islam) stands out for its extremist views and violent participation in Iranian politics in the decade following the war. The purpose of this article is to briefly review the Fadā'iyān's history, organization, ideology, and social base from the date of its inception to the present time.

The Fadā'iyān-i Islam was formed in 1945 by Sayyid Mūjtabā Navvāb Ṣafavī in Tehran¹. Navvāb Ṣafavī was born in 1923 in Tehran in a religious family known as Mirlawhī. The family name was changed to Navvāb Ṣafavī (deputies of the Safavids) to identify with the famous Shi'i dynasty of the Safavids who in the sixteenth century made Shi'ism the state religion of Iran. The family was deeply religious and claimed descent from the Prophet Mūḥammad and on the mother's side, from the Safavids. Navvāb had his early schooling in Tehran. He had completed the eighth grade when his father passed away. Navvāb quit

school and for a while was employed at the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. He then left for the well-known Shi'i religious center of Najaf in Iraq and became a theology student².

In Najaf, Navvāb became acquainted with the works of the distinguished Iranian intellectual and historian, Ahmad Kasravi. Kasravi's books and articles were antagonistic toward traditional Shi'ism and held the religion responsible for many ills of the Iranian society. In one of his works, Kasravi reviews Shi'ism historically and concludes that through distortion and misrepresentation of facts, Shi'ism has led the Iranians astray. He says:

Shi'ism, in addition to being incompatible with wisdom and thus objectionable on this ground, is also a hindrance to [a meaningful] life.... This religion has led its followers astray and away from [true] religion. The Shi'is call themselves the "group of redeemers" and do not recognize any but their own religion. But the truth is the opposite of that and they are completely out of [the realm of true] religion³.

Angered and distraught by Kasravi's unorthodox views and his anticlericalism, Navvāb, now in a religious garb, returned to Tehran "to discover whether the author was as evil as his works"⁴. Having interviewed Kasravi and having become convinced of his evil, Navvāb set out to assassinate him. The first attempt on Kasravi's life resulted in the historian's injury and Navvāb's imprisonment for three weeks. When released, Navvāb again arranged for Kasravi's assassination. In March 1946 Kasravi and his secretary were liquidated in the Ministry of Justice by two devoted followers of Navvāb, the Imāmī brothers.

Navvāb departed for Mashhad and from there to Najaf where he established relations with Āyat Allāh Abū al-Qāsim Kāshānī. An alliance was formed between Navvāb and Kāshānī which lasted from August 1946 until May 1951⁵. Soon after, both Kāshānī and Navvāb returned to Tehran and initiated political activities. Kāshānī's arrest in July 1946 for antigovernment activities found

the Fadā'iyān searching for ways to gain his release. The fall of the then premier Ahmad Qavam in 1947 led to Kāshānī's release. Kāshānī's freedom signaled the beginning of a new period of public protests and demonstrations by the Fadā'iyān and Kāshānī's supporters. These demonstrations were staged to support a variety of specific causes ranging from condemnation of Jewish terrorism in Palestine to support of oil nationalization.

In February 1949 an attempt was made on the Shah Mūhammad Rizā Pahlavī's life. There were conflicting reports on the assailant's connections. The Tūdh (Communist) Party was officially held responsible for the act and banned by the government. But the assailant had a reporter's card from the religious newspaper, Parcham-i Islam (The Banner of Islam). Kāshānī was exiled for sixteen months to Syria and Lebanon in connection with the episode.

The assassination of the Minister of the Court, 'Abdūl Ḥusayn Hazhīr, in November 1949 at the Sipah Sālār Mosque by one of the infamous Imāmī brothers was clearly the act of the Fadā'iyān. The murder probably had the approval of Kāshānī although he was in exile at the time.

It now appeared to the Fadā'iyān that their policy of terror was paying off. Kāshānī's return in 1950 and the increasing importance of oil nationalization in Iran, provided ample reasons for the Fadā'iyān's terrorist activities. The new prime minister, General 'Alī Razmārā, was negotiating a new oil agreement with the British. The drafted agreement was opposed by the parliament and ran counter to popular sentiments. In March 1951, Khalīl Ṭahmāsibī, a devoted follower of Navvāb Ṣafavī succeeded in assassinating the prime minister at the Shah Mosque. Kāshānī was implicated in Razmārā's assassination, but no action was taken against him. The increasing boldness of the Fadā'iyān was evident in a proclamation issued a few days after Ṭahmāsibī's arrest in which they threatened the Shah and Razmārā's cabinet members with death if the assassin was not released within three days⁶. Ṭahmāsibī's release was eventually secured in 1952

through a bill passed by the lower house of the parliament but never ratified by the Senate. The bill specified that "Because it is obvious to the public that 'Ali Razmārā was a traitor, Khalīl Ṭahmāsibī will be pardoned and released from prison on the basis of this law which will go into effect as soon as it has been proved that he is Razmārā's assassin"⁷.

Not long after Razmārā's assassination, the relationship between the Fadā'iyān and Kāshānī became estranged, soon to be broken off completely. In an interview with the New York Times correspondent, Navvāb Ṣafavī declared that the Fadā'iyān "have irrevocably broken away from Kashani". He charged that Kāshānī's group and the National Front had "promised to set up an Islamic country according to the precepts of the Koran. Instead they have helped to set up martial law, imprisoned our brothers and suspended our newspaper"⁸. Richard Cottam explains the break between the Fadā'iyān and Kāshānī on ideological grounds. He points out that the Fadā'iyān's absolutism and their complete subordination of politics to religion "made the political Kashani a natural target"⁹.

The same line of reasoning may also be used to explain the Fadā'iyān's antagonism toward the National Front, in spite of their early support of the movement. Although the Fadā'iyān had strong nationalist leanings, they could not have associated too closely with the secularist leaders of the National Front. The depth of this antagonism was made clear when a member of the Fadā'iyān attempted to assassinate Dr. Ḥūsayn Fāṭimī, the well-known publisher and National Front Majlis deputy (and later Dr. Mūṣaddiq's foreign minister) in February 1952. Mūṣaddiq was apparently the assailant's first choice. It was rumored that one reason for the attempted assassination of Fāṭimī was his omission of the final sentence "Long Live Islam" from Ṭahmāsibī's pronouncement against Razmārā in Fāṭimī's newspaper, Bākhtar-i Imrūz¹⁰.

The Fadā'iyān's final act of terrorism took place in November 1955 when Mūẓaffar Zū al-Qadr tried to assassinate prime

minister Ḥūsayn 'Alā at the Shah Mosque just before 'Alā's departure to Iraq to represent Iran in the Baghdad Pact. Although 'Alā was injured, the attempted assassination was a failure. The assailant, a small shopowner, was wearing a white shroud underneath his garments on which a few passages in red ink were inscribed from the Qūr'ān. In the official interrogation, he repeated his belief in Islamic injunctions and maintained that since the Baghdad Pact is a military and defense pact and that it will result in the death of young Iranians, it should therefore be abrogated¹¹.

The government quickly rounded up the top leadership of the Fadā'iyān as well as sympathizers and former associates such as Kāshānī. During the course of the Fadā'iyān's trials new light was shed on Razmārā's assassination. It was reported in one instance that Kāshānī had confessed to have issued a fatwā condoning Razmārā's liquidation¹². Kāshānī and others who had been arrested were soon released. The government, however, executed four of the top leaders of the Fadā'iyān including Navvāb Ṣafavī in January 1956. With these executions the brief and violent history of the Fadā'iyān-i Islam was, for the time being, closed¹³. Minor elements of the Fadā'iyān, however, continued to operate underground and clandestinely on a small scale. The Fadā'iyān's name reemerged in the news in January 1965 when members of a secretive organization known as the Islamic Nations Party (Hizb-i Millat-i Islami) assassinated prime minister Ḥasan 'Alī Manṣūr at the entrance to the parliament building. It was revealed during the trials that some of the accused had been members of the Fadā'iyān - one serving as the organization's treasurer. The extent of the Fadā'iyān's relationship with the Islamic Nations Party is not clear. However, both organizations recruited their members from those in the lower socio-economic strata and had similar goals for the reestablishment of Islamic supremacy in Iran.

In the period since the Iranian revolution, the Fadā'iyān have been officially resurrected under the leadership of Shaykh

Ṣādiq Khalkhālī, the judge of the revolutionary Islamic courts and a close associate of Āyat Allāh Rūh Allāh Khūmaynī. In a recent interview, Khalkhālī maintains that he has been a member of the Fadā'iyān since his days as an ordinary religious student (Talabih). He further states that the Fadā'iyān's activities are now in the open.

We no longer need to engage in underground activities. We have a revolutionary court and can summon the guilty to our court. The Fadā'iyān's operation, however, will not be limited to Iran. It will extend to all Islamic lands ¹⁴.

Membership, Organization and Ideology

The size of the Fadā'iyān's membership was consistently small. Adele Ferdows estimates that at its height the organization had between 20 to 25,000 members in Tehran and about 12 to 15,000 members in other cities, notably Mashhad ¹⁵. A recently declassified Foreign Service Despatch of the United States Government attests to the Fadā'iyān's small size.

The Fedayan Islam can in no way be considered a mass movement, nor is it well organized. Safavi has at various times claimed a membership of 5,000 and a following of sympathizers of 100,000. At outdoor meetings called by the Fedayan in the past, never more than a few hundred have appeared. Even these, however, must be considered more as followers of Kashani than of the Fedayan proper. After his arrest, Safavi's faction of the Fedayan was unable to gather more than 100 persons to demonstrate in front of the prison where he was being held ¹⁶.

The Fadā'iyān membership was drawn almost exclusively from illiterate or semi-literate lower or lower-middle class youth from the bazaar. For example, the average age of twenty-nine members of the Fadā'iyān who were tried in 1952 was twenty-

four and practically all of them had low status occupations ¹⁷. Moreover, three of the Fadā'iyān assassins whose occupations were known, had low status jobs ranging from a carpenter to an attendant in a small store to a small shopowner.

The number of those who sympathized with the Fadā'iyān was much larger. The coalition with Kāshānī made the Fadā'iyān appear to be much more powerful than their true strength warranted. Handsome financial support was provided to the Fadā'iyān by a few known Tehran merchants ¹⁸. There were also allegations to the effect that the Fadā'iyān had connections with similar fraternal groups in Iraq and Egypt. In an announcement in 1955, the Iranian government charged that the Fadā'iyān had ties with the Tūdiḥ military network and that Navvāb Ṣafavī as well as fifteen of the Fadā'iyān terrorists had received military instructions from the Tūdiḥ officers in the military. Navvāb himself had claimed in an interview that "he could wield greater influence over Iranian Communists, although himself not a Communist, than could premier Stalin" ¹⁹. It is doubtful that any formal ties existed between the Fadā'iyān and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The Iraqi connections probably consisted of a few Iranian sympathizers and members of the Fadā'iyān who were residents of Iraq ²⁰. It is possible that some Tūdiḥ military officers instructed a few of the Fadā'iyān in the use of weapons, but the two organizations were diametrically opposed in their ideologies and no long-range cooperation could have worked out between them.

Navvāb Ṣafavī was the key figure in the Fadā'iyān organization. His position of eminence and leadership was recognized by all of his followers. The circle of top leadership included in addition to Navvāb, the Vāhidī brothers. The two brothers were of great importance because of their organizational ability and "intellectual" contribution to the Fadā'iyān. But none of them were in any way equal to Navvāb. Even when an internal dispute apparently arose between the Vāhidī brothers and Navvāb

and the temporary departure of the Vāhidī brothers from the organization was announced, the brothers explicitly stated that Navvāb is their acknowledged leader and that they are of no consequence without him²¹.

The Fadā'iyān's ideology combined religious zeal and belief in the supremacy of Shi'i Islam with a strong sense of Iranian nationalism. The Fadā'iyān sought to "purify the Persian language" and hoped to bring the Iranian-Shi'i lands together and establish an Islamic government²². They viewed secular government as usurper of power and authority which in their view belonged to a theocratic Shi'i leadership under a caliphate or an imam. As Nikki Keddie and A. H. Zarrinkub point out, the Fadā'iyān's

goals included strict enforcement of the shari'ah and the ending of irreligiousness. They combined fundamentalism with violent xenophobia, and considered attacks on foreigners and politicians with foreign connections a defense of Dar al-Islam. The Fadā'iyān proclaimed the government of "xenophiles" illegitimate, and called such men enemy spies whose blood must be shed²³.

In their book of ideology, Rāhnamā-yi Haqā'iq (The Guide to Truth) published in 1950, the Fadā'iyān assert that "the present government of Iran is unconstitutional and illegal" and is composed of "traitors and usurpers... and the enemies of Islam"²⁴. This book shows some ambivalence regarding the monarchy. Although it denounces the Shah and his government in very harsh terms, at times it gives the impression that a monarch who rules according to Islamic laws and follows religious precepts might be tolerated. In a section discussing the Shah's duties, it is said that the Shah must be guided by the rules and principles of Shi'i Islam and must choose the first Shi'i imām, 'Alī, as his model. In addition, specific religious duties such as paying proper respect to the holy shrines, participation in congregational prayers, and supervision of religious endow-

ments are assigned to him²⁵. The section is concluded with the remark that if the monarch continuously checks his "duties and responsibilities... as dictated by religion..., then he will be the Shah"²⁶.

In discussing the Iranian parliament, The Fadā'iyān maintain that all those laws passed by the Majlis which are contrary to Islamic principles must be abrogated. The parliament deputies

must not pass laws and set rules for the country, because God alone has the right to make rules. Laws and rules which are based on the meager and feeble minds of humans and which are contrary to the spirit and the wisdom of the Islamic laws and principles are unlawful and unacceptable. Iran is officially a Muslim land, and all of the rules and regulations of the society must be based strictly upon the principles of Ja'fari Islam²⁷.

The Fadā'iyān's social and economic views are traditional and at times strikingly naive. They believe that the proper and best place for a woman is "to be the manager of the house and a mother and wife"²⁸. They ridicule the notion of women's rights and advocate temporary marriages to eradicate prostitution²⁹.

They compare the operation of the nation's economy to the running of grocery stores and find the grocer to be the best choice for heading the ministry of economy or finance: "If a pious grocer were to replace the corrupt minister of finance, he could manage and develop the economy of the country much better than any honest and capable minister of finance anywhere in the world who claims expertise in the science of economy and finance"³⁰. Moreover, there are specific suggestions for lowering the cost of living and for instituting taxes based on Islamic principles³¹.

The Fadā'iyān propose the establishment of a ministry of justice to adjudicate disputes according to Islamic laws and to apply strict religious punishments for the wrongdoers. Thus, the

Fadā'iyān expect the thief's hand to be cut off and the adulterer whipped in public³². The Fadā'iyān's militancy is also evident in their insistence that "military instruction and war techniques... be taught in schools during the physical education hour as a regular part of the program"³³. They believe that "military principles of Qur'an" must be basic to any military training³⁴. This includes the idea of the holy war against the infidels and enemies of Islam.

Conclusion

The Fadā'iyān's appeal and following was quite limited. They never managed to attract a cross-section of the population. Their political importance was due to their successful terrorist activities and the general social and political conditions in Iran after World War II. The Fadā'iyān's failure to extend their appeal beyond the lower and lower-middle classes in the bazaar stands in sharp contrast to the success of the Egyptian al-Ikhwān al-Mūslimīn (The Muslim Brotherhood) in securing members from most sectors of society. Although there was much similarity between the Ikhwān and the Fadā'iyān in the areas of tactics, use of terrorism, goals of an "Islamic order", urban appeal, and anti-Western orientation, the similarity ends when one scrutinizes closely the organization or programs of the two groups³⁵. The Ikhwān had a vast organization with branches, administrative offices, and sections and committees dealing with problems of labor, peasantry, students, finance, and legal and policy matters. The Fadā'iyān could claim no such organizational apparatus.

The Ikhwān had a much more elaborate and sophisticated program for political organization based on Islamic law. This involved dividing the governmental sector into five distinct spheres of executive, judicial, financial, and "control and reform"³⁶. In addition, such basic principles as freedom of thought, worship, expression, education, and possession were specifically singled

out as having been proclaimed by Islam³⁷. The Ikhwān were also aware of the importance of social contract and practice of consultation with representatives of the people³⁸. The Fadā'iyān's program for political organization, though detailed, was simplistic and dealt essentially with the reorganization of the existing ministries in very general terms. There was no real attempt to relate the proposed reorganizations to broader principles of politics and political community. Moreover, there was much ambiguity in their discussion of the monarchy and the Majlis.

The Ikhwān's proposals on economic and social organization were also more elaborate and cohesive. They agreed to the right of private ownership but modified the extent of private accumulation of wealth by forbidding monopoly and by proposing taxation on the basis of "a statutory level of property"³⁹. The Fadā'iyān's economic program also emphasized taxation and private property rights, but this was coupled with simplistic analyses of the operation of the market and financial management. On the question of women's rights, the Ikhwān were a step ahead of the Fadā'iyān. The Ikhwān at least envisaged equal political rights for women in the future and were more tolerant of women's gainful employment in law, medicine, or business.

In a fundamental way, however, the Fadā'iyān and the Ikhwān had something in common. Both were violent reactions to social, political, and cultural changes that had disturbed the social fabrics of Iran and Egypt. Richard Mitchell's discussion of the Ikhwān violence underlines the problem admirably and may be extended to include aspects of the Fadā'iyān violence.

Violence with the Brothers... was in many respects a response to the situation in Egypt and had much in common with the violence of other Egyptians. The difference lay in the Islamic dimension which the Brothers claimed as their own, and which precipitated a variety of violence in both political and social life which was characterized primarily by rigid intolerance⁴⁰.

Both organizations, then, emerged as severe reactions to crises that had beset the social order in Iran and Egypt. A combination of economic dislocations caused by the World War and the overwhelming presence of the "infidel" power incited the two fundamentalist groups to question the legitimacy of the national leaders and their values. The yearning of the Fadā'iyān and the Ikhwān to return to the "Golden Age" of Islam - when problems were not so complicated and one's position in the social order was more clearly established - had much appeal among the masses.

NOTES

* A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 42nd annual meeting of the Association for the Sociology of Religion and the Society for the Study of Social Problems, New York, NY, August 1980.

¹ The exact date of the founding of the Fadā'iyān is in dispute. Ferdows cites 1945 as the founding date, Abrahamian and the recently declassified Foreign Service Despatch of the U. S. State Department believe it was 1946, while Keddie and Zarrinkub use 1943 as the base year for the Fadā'iyān's activities. Published reports of the Iranian government during the Fadā'iyān trials cite 1945 as the founding date which appears to be correct. Furthermore, in the introduction to the 1979 reprint of the Fadā'iyān's book of ideology, *Rāhnamā-yi Haqā'iq*, again 1324/1945 is given as the founding date. See Adele Ferdows, *Religion in Iranian Nationalism: The Study of the Fadayān-i Islam*, (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Indiana University, 1967), p. 26. Ervand Abrahamian, *Social Bases of Iranian Politics: The Tudah Party, 1941-53*, (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Columbia University, 1969), p. 134. Nikki Keddie and A. H. Zarrinkub, *Fidā'iyyān-i Islam*, [in:] *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New ed., 1965, p. 882. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Service Despatch Tehran to Washington, No. 20, July 7, 1951, p. 1. *Ittilā'āt*, December 27, 1955, p. 4.

² Background information on Navvāb Safavī can be found in Ferdows, p. 33 and *Ittilā'āt*, December 27 and 31, 1955.

³ Ahmad Kasravī, *Bikhvānand va Dāvāri Kūnand* (Tehran: Paymān Press, 1324/1945); p. 45. Kasravī had also written that the Safavid dynasty's claim of descent from Prophet was a forgery. Navvāb was angered by Kasravī's charge and had further incentive to plan Kasravī's assassination.

⁴ Abrahamian, p. 134.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 135. For details see Mohammad Hassan Faghfoory, *The Role of the Ulama in Twentieth Century Iran with Particular Reference to Ayatullah Haj Sayyid Abul-Qasim Kāshānī*, (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1978), pp. 164-203.

⁶ See *Ittilā'āt*, March 11, 1951.

⁷ Text in *Taragqi*, August 5, 1951, p. 1; quoted in Ferdows, p. 61.

⁸ *New York Times*, May 13, 1951, p. 3.

⁹ Richard Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), p. 152. Cottam also points out that the cynics have maintained that this break was due to Kāshānī's refusal to subsidize the Fadā'iyān for their support. Another explanation is supplied by Faghfoory who states that the Fadā'iyān's demands for an active role in the government was denied by Kāshānī who was certain Mūshaddiq would veto such a request. See Faghfoory, pp. 194-197.

¹⁰ Abrahamian, p. 166. The fifteen-year old assailant, Mūhammad Mihdī 'Abd-i Khūdā'ī, was a minor attendant in a small hardware store. He had been a member of the Fadā'iyān for only six months. The following sentences were inscribed on his weapon: "Death to the enemies of Islam"; "Immediate implementation of Islam's holy injunctions"; "Immediate freedom of His Holiness Navvāb Šafavī and Master Tahmāsibi"; "Cutting off hands of foreigners and suppression of Iran's enemies: Russia, England, America". See *Ittilā'āt*, February 16, 1952 and April 15, 1953.

¹¹ See *Ittilā'āt*, November 18, 1955. Some have claimed that the assassination of Dr. 'Abdūl Ḥamid Zanganih, the Dean of Law Faculty at Tehran University, in March 1951 was also the work of the Fadā'iyān. However, I have not so far discovered any convincing evidence to link Zanganih's assassin to the Fadā'iyān.

¹² *Ittilā'āt*, January 22, 1956.

¹³ 'Abdūl Ḥusayn Vāhidī, the top intellectual and number two man of the Fadā'iyān was killed in November 1955 after his arrest on his way to Tehran from Ahvāz while attempting to escape from the hands of the police.

¹⁴ *Umūd-i Irān*, New series, Tīr 4 1358/1979, p. 22. The Fadā'iyān members received international notoriety when in May 1980, under Judge Khalkhālī's direction, succeeded in demolishing a marble mausoleum built some twenty years ago to honor the founder of the Pahlavī dynasty, Rīzā Shah.

¹⁵ Ferdows, p. 40.

¹⁶ U. S. Department of State, Foreign Service Despatch, No. 20, p. 4.

¹⁷ See Abrahamian, p. 136. The occupation of fifteen of these were published in newspapers. These were: "two shirt-tailors, a theology student, a glass seller, a preacher, a dry cleaner, a carpenter, an architect-builder, a weaver, a draper's apprentice, an engraver, a metal peddler, a grocer, a machine owner, and bicycle repairer;" cited in Abrahamian, p. 136.

¹⁸ Ferdows, p. 66.

¹⁹ New York Times, May 13, 1951, p. 3.

²⁰ Keddie and Zarrinkub maintain that the Fadā'iyān "had ties" with the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq and Egypt, and "like the Ikhwān as well as many co-religious groups of the past they called each other 'brethren'". See Keddie and Zarrinkub, p. 882. Richard Mitchell, however, points out that there were apparently no "formal" ties between the Fadā'iyān and the Ikhwān. He indicates that Navvāb Ṣafavī visited Egypt in January 1954 and was welcomed by the Ikhwān, but probably his "stress on Shi'i Islam would make him automatically a 'non-ally' ". Letter from Professor Richard P. Mitchell, Department of History, University of Michigan, December 5, 1972. See also Richard Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 126, n. 60.

²¹ For the text see Ittilā'āt, May 13, 1953.

²² Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 82. See also Ferdows, p. 51. There was apparently an irredentist strain in the Fadā'iyān's ideology. But this like many other of the Fadā'iyān views was not fully developed.

²³ Keddie and Zarrinkub, p. 882.

²⁴ Fadā'iyān-i Islam, Rāhnamā-yi Haqā'iq, trans. Adele Ferdows; see her Ph. D. thesis.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 79-80.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 80.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 85.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 41.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 49.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 51-52.

³² Ibid., p. 34.

³³ Ibid., p. 68.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 71.

³⁵ See Mitchell especially pp. 234-241, 254-259, 264-267, 281 and 328-331.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 248.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 249.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 247-248.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 253.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 320.