

38. King Sarhang attacks Iran. Many defenders die. The king of Iran orders his servants to go and ask Rustam for help.
39. Rustam defeats the enemies of Iran and brings the killed knights' bodies to Zabul.
40. Jaghak /Jāl/, Rustam's brother, deceitfully inflicts, at the king's order, a mortal wound on Rustam. The latter kills his assailant with an arrow but dies himself, too.

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JADWIGA PSTRUSIŃSKA

THE IMPACT OF THE AFGHAN WAR ON THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS IN THE POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA — TAJIKISTAN CASE

It was obvious already many years ago that the Afghan war has been influencing the religious and political consciousness of Moslem societies living in the Soviet Central Asia and supporting local ideas of a democratic state, those times existing only underground. What does it mean local ideas of a democratic state in this region is difficult to precise. Certainly its democratic movement is young and inexperienced due to the lack of democratic traditions, institutions or structures. (DB, Fall 1992:9) In this situation examples had to come from the outside world. (For instance I.T 1992:107) Afghanistan, having together with Tajikistan a very substantial common historical and cultural background, and the most substantial mutual ethnic and linguistic percentage of sameness, in comparison with other post-Soviet states in its north has been, especially after the Afghan war began, a main source of direct and indirect influences in this respect, intentionally organized or appearing by chance. After disappearing of the Soviet state when, among others, the imposing concept of a supranational identity suddenly died, this impact continued and became stronger and much diversified.

The Afghan war is clearly not over. Southern influences on Tajikistan existed, however, already before the Afghan war. The fact that it was a Moslem country with people practising freely their religion was always a positive example of democracy. The Soviet custom along Amu Darya had clearly, long time before the war, special instructions regarding any attempts of bringing into the Central Asia any religious materials. I, myself had an opportunity to witness confiscation of rosaries, religious texts, objects with religious inscriptions or symbols etc. which use to have Afghan travellers in their luggage. Not understanding the Arabic alphabet the Soviet custom took anything with inscription suspected to be religious for instance key-pendants with "Kobra is the best boot polish" on them.

During the Afghan war there were two types of contacts between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. There was an official one led by the Kabul regime supported by Moscow and an unofficial led by the Afghan opposition including its politicians, intellectuals and local guerillas.

There was in Kabul, after the 1978 coup, a programmed linguistic and ethnic policy and manipulation and a programmed manipulation of existing data and information on the question. (Pstrusińska 1990:44-63) A strong

Soviet influence in this matter has been obvious. Pashtun provinces have been bombarded as the first ones during the war and Afghan refugees are first of all Pashtun people. (More on the question in: Pstrusińska 1990:44—63) A lot of efforts have been given to destroy the previous Pashtun hegemony and diminish use of Pashto and create a country with Tajik people and Dari language dominance which is a local version of Persian (Farsi), a very similar one to that of Tajiki. Anahita Ratebzad, one of the most important Kabul officials, reportedly asked comrades from the communist Party in Tajikistan for help in establishing a country governed by Tajik people, having now gotten rid of the Pashtun. (Pstrusińska 1990:45) When Kabul regime still hoped to build a communist country, we used to find among its statements that there is about 7 million Tajik people, that Tajik cover the whole country, more or less evenly, except of Nuristan, and that it is the only nationality in Afghanistan which has an ancient culture and a single language. (Pstrusińska 1990:47).

Tajik USSR was also very much interested in its southern neighbour. In the middle of seventies Afghan studies were already one of the main fields in the Oriental Institute of the Tajikistan Academy of Sciences and still continued to develop during the war. (Saidmuradov 1989:75—81) To the Afghan war period belongs also new Soviet theses on the ethnogenesis of Tajik people. According to R. Makhmadshoev the area of forming Tajik nation was much broader than the Central Asian Mawarannahr or Fergano-Pamirian region and covered the whole territory of Afghanistan. He includes to the components which created Tajik nation such Afghanistan's minorities as Ormuri or Parachi. Generally his whole publication stresses strongly sameness of Tajik people on both sides of the border (Makhmadshoev 1989:6). Soviet theory has been supported by numerous practical measures. Simultaneously, however, a Soviet scholar G.P. Ezhov (Ezhov 1990:86) writes in his critical analysis, published in 1991, that the whole population of Afghanistan before the war was merely 13.05 million (Ezhov 1990:88), what supports rather reticent views of Polish scholars in this matter, (Pstrusińska 1990:37—38, Gawęcki 1983:29—31) and that within this amount there was only about 3.5 Tajik people (Ezhov 1990:88). According to the former Soviet and Kabul data there was several million people more in this country and one could read data reaching even 19 million.

In parallel to the official Soviet/Kabul policy there was during the Afghan war an authentic, later on accelerated by the perestroika, rediscovery of the mutual heritage, as some Tajik scholars and intellectuals described it. Such terms started to be used as Farsi-Dari-Tajiki cultural category. (Shaheedi 1991a) Generally the perestroika in Tajikistan was a reberthing of values of the past. The Tajik started to consider reestimation of Islamic values. (Shaheedi 1991b) New organizations have been established in Tajikistan to serve the renaissance of the Tajiki culture and language. As far as alphabet is concerned, a very basic and important factor, the split between Tajiki and Dari is not so wide at present as it was in the past. People in Afghanistan who learned some Russian knows Cyrillic alphabet and Arabic script started to be used again in Tajikistan. Interestingly during the last several years more and more new

lexical borrowings from Afghan Persian (Dari) have been appearing in Tajiki. (Kerimova 1990) In addition Tajik are even quite well acquainted with the new Afghan poetry. Crucial in all these matters were certainly some kind of contacts with Afghanistan. It is obvious that not only Afghan opposition but also Kabul/Soviet regime has willy-nilly helped to establish mutual contacts between Tajik from Afghanistan and Tajik from the former Soviet Tajikistan, broken by the Russia in the previous century, what would certainly influence their following relations. The irony is that what was introduced to build a communist regime in Afghanistan might help to abolish the outlived communist regime in Tajikistan. Simultaneously, however I met an opinion of some Tajik intellectuals that they fear that Iran or Afghanistan might attempt to annex them in the future. This opinion, however, might have been seen as well as a Soviet inspiration to prevent movements towards separatism.

Certainly the Afghan jihad inspired the Muslim of Central Asia. We can at present consider this impact as a substantial factor in the democratisation process in the Soviet Union, the Soviet Central Asia and on the separate Soviet republics bordering Afghanistan. There has been numerous reports in eighties about direct or indirect Afghan influence, some of them already in the beginning of the war. The earliest and most valuable academic contributions on the subject were published by Aleksandre Bennigsen. (For instance: Bennigsen 1985, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c) Academic and journalistic articles gave evidence of the spillover of Islamic ideas in the Soviet Muslim region, appearance in Central Asia of Islamic books, documents and manuscripts which originated especially from Afghanistan. (Bennigsen, Wimbush 1985b:93) In some cases western help in providing religious and political materials for transfer used to take place. Without any doubts spread of uncensored information on the Afghan war, from various kinds of foreign and independent Afghan sources, was this kind of influence. It is difficult to overestimate the access to free information, and its conscious confrontation with official media, as a factor on the way towards democracy. Afghanistan was also the nearest example of political pluralism, political programmes and models, freedom of religious practices, unlimited possession of property, freedom in leading private business, free travelling and many others. Certainly Afghanistan started to attract during the war attention of the Soviet Tajik people in a decisive way for the future events. There was a new discovery, due to the Afghan resistance, that Russians can be challenged and resisted, and that USSR might not be eternal. (Bennigsen 1986b:6) In the first half of eighties a Tajik academic, a high ranking party member, defined the Afghan resistance as a gleam of hope for Soviet Tajik. (Bennigsen 1986b:6) And it was certainly not without meaning that one of the main Afghan heroes, ruler of a very substantial part of northern Afghanistan during the war, called sometimes Masudistan, was a Tajik.

The first hand information on the Afghan struggle with the occupant have been among others dispersed in Tajikistan by Soviet Tajik soldiers who in the initial stage of the war used to be sent to Afghanistan. In December 1979 when Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek represented

30–40% of the invading force. After about three months almost all Moslem soldiers were pulled out as unreliable. They fraternized with Moslem brothers, and knew the local languages what their Russian officers rarely did. Several thousands of Turkestani, however, among them Tajik, remained as drivers, interpreters etc. Inhabitants of Tajik USSR had an opportunity to witness movements of the Soviet forces on their territory and other preparation for the war in Afghanistan. (Bennigsen 1986a:2) Another source of information were Afghans sent there by Kabul/Soviet regime, mainly for education but possible also prisoners and others.

It is obvious that opportunities for contacts between Afghan and Soviet Muslims have increased dramatically after the Soviet invasion. The border has soon become permeable. (Bennigsen 1985:12) It is known that Afghan mujahedin groups, especially Hezb-e Islami and Jamiyat-e Islam were interested and aware of the conditions of Islam across the Amu Darya and claimed unofficially to have established contacts with Muslim religious dissenters there. This information was somehow confirmed by the Soviet press in numerous articles appearing in Tajikistan. It was written frequently about efficiency of Soviet border guards and appealed for "vigilance against spies, saboteurs, infiltrators, diversionists, and religious fanatics". (Bennigsen, Wimbush 1985: 110–111) One who has seen the upper parts of Amu Darya knows that it is relatively easy to cross it, at least during some seasons. The more towards the west the more dangerous are any attempts to cross it, so Tajikistan had and still has a special geographical position in the events on the border between Afghanistan and the former USSR.

The Afghan impact on Tajikistan after the Soviet forces' withdrawal from Afghanistan, sudden collapse of the whole USSR, and the collapse of the communist regime in Kabul has been clearly developing with great speed. Several sources confirm that Tajik opposition has its bases in Afghanistan and their people being armed and trained there. (For instance: Le Vine 1993; AN, 1 Oct. 1992, 1 Feb. 1993, 1 May 1993) Reportedly there is in Taloqan, provincial capital of northern Afghanistan, the headquarters of Tajikistan's Islamic Renaissance Party, the most important opposition group in the former Soviet Tajikistan. The council of northeastern Afghan leaders, with its head Ahmad Shah Masud, appears to be its main sponsor. The council gave them premises, military training and arm. (Le Vine 1993) Some Afghan groups speak readily about going to fight in Tajikistan. According to Afghans and foreign aid employees two militant fundamentalist parties are training and arming Tajik fighters. (Le Vine 1993) Tajik guerrillas possess even some Stingers from among the so-called "missed in action Stingers". About 1000 Stingers have been passed to Afghan mujahedin by USA and only about 700 used by them. (GW, 6 Aug. 1993, following Reuter) Hezb-e Islami has already trained about 1000 Tajik people according to its local commander. Reportedly the stronghold called Emam Saheb, near the Tajik border, is a training site. Another training site, led by the Afghan Ittehad-e Islami, is situated in Kunduz. (Le Vine 1993) Infiltration back to Afghanistan takes place in mountainous region of Pamir. (Le Vine 1993) It was always one of the Afghanistan's regions which

are very difficult to control. In seventies I have seen the last Afghan post in Gazkhan. Most of the Wakhan corridor provided dozens of possible places to cross the border. On the Soviet site there, however, a build road was seen, as well as frequent military posts. Regular night-time drives of military vehicles checking with huge reflectors the terrain used to take place. At present the border is certainly guarded even more carefully.

The Afghan soil have been already in the past perceived as a friendly one. We had examples of it during the Stalinists' terror period, for instance. Soon after reinstatement of the communist government in Tajikistan, last year, thousands of Tajik refugees, about 100 000–350 000–600 000, according to different sources, have arrived to Afghanistan (Le Vine 1993; Jagielski 1993:14; AN Aug. 1993) People supporting the idea of creating again a big Turkestan in Central Asia, Tajikistan inclusive, should take into account the fact that Tajik chose to take refuge rather in the devastated by war Afghanistan, with its inner conflicts, than in a neighbouring post-Soviet country. Interestingly After the Soviet withdrawal numerous Afghan communists took refuge in Tajikistan. There is reportedly about 300 000 Afghans in Tajikistan at present. (AN, 1 Oct. 1992:6) According to other sources they number only 50 000 in the whole CIS. (Hyman 1993) Numerous officers of the former political police and the Kabul army found new jobs in their old profession in the contemporary Tajikistan. (Jagielski 1993:14) Last but not least Tajik partisans adopted recently, a rich in associations due to the Afghan war, self designation mujahedin. (Jagielski 1993:14)

We can find such views on the contemporary Afghan — Tajik conflict in the publikations printed in Kabul:

"... The Mujahideen began to take an interest in Central Asia when they were fighting the Soviet Union. During the years of Jihad the Mujahideen tried to take the message of their struggle to the Muslims in Central Asia by different means. This was part of the war against the Soviet Union. After formation of the Islamic government and disintegration of the Soviet Union, the situation changed. ... The government is not arming Tajiks who fight against the Doshanbe government. ..." (AN, 5 March 1993)

"... Despite their present shortcomings, the Islamic movement and democrats in Tajikistan fight for a noble cause. They speak for the majority of the people of Tajikistan. They will finally succeed if they continue their struggle by proper available means. ... Kabul is not Doshanbe and there are no indications that Kabul will become Doshanbe. The chance that Doshanbe will become Kabul is much closer to the reality. ..." (AN, 15 Jan. 1993)

"... The people in the north sympathize with the Tajik refugees for many reasons: Some of the people living in the north had escaped the communist persecution of the Stalin era. They also experienced the tyranny of the Afghan communist and the occupation of Soviet forces. They know how

difficult it is to live under the communist rule. The people of Tajikistan share common religion, language and culture with people of Afghanistan. They also have been forced to leave their homes to protect their religion against communists' onslaught. ..." (AN, 15 Dec. 1992)

The same, quoted above, Afghan press, transferred after the collapse of communist government from Pakistan to Kabul, wishes, however, "... a happy new year to its Afghan, Iranian and Tajik readers ..." (AN, 1 Apr. 1992) what clearly means that the publication is addressed also to readers in Tajikistan and aims to make the Afghan views available and known beyond the northern border.

Despite this most difficult situation, the fact that Moscow and Dushanbe accuse Kabul of armed interference, and even call it the incursion of the armed forces of Afghanistan into Tajikistan (AN, 12 Jul. 1993), the Afghan post-communist government has been trying to keep the best possible relations with the post-Soviet Tajikistan. In addition Uzbekistan accuses Afghanistan of spreading of Islamic fundamentalism. (AN, 1 Apr. 1993) Kabul says about internal roots of Tajikistan's the problem. (AN, 1 Apr. 1993) It also pointed that due to its own domestic difficulties is unable to control successfully the border. (AN, 15 Jan. 1993)

At present Afghanistan plays for Tajikistan a role similar to that played by Pakistan during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. First of all it is a country of a Tajik mass exodus and a place to keep hostages taken in Tajikistan by the local opposition. Moreover there are training camps for Tajik mujahedin there. The international help given by UN for the Tajik refugees and some western foreign aid goes through Afghanistan. Similarly other countries like Iran, Pakistan or Arab countries have been using Afghanistan territory for transfer of their influences or help. Tajikistan has accused, for instance, Jamaat Islami of Pakistan of helping Tajik Moslem insurgents. (AN, Apr. 1993) In addition one of the northern cities in Afghanistan has been pointed out as a possible site of a Tajik government in exile as it was for several years Peshawar in Pakistan for Afghans. Tajik mujahedin discuss also, however, which Afghan opposition mistakes should not be automatically copied by Tajik. (Jagielski 1993:15)

It can be said, to conclude, that the Afghan war played the most crucial role on the Tajikistan's way towards democracy. The impact was possible and especially strong and effective due to the geographical situation and ethnic, linguistic and religious sameness. We should remember that for everybody in Central Asia Afghans are us while Russians are them. (Bennigsen, Lemercier 1986:12) This is even more true in Tajik people case. An exception are perhaps only local communists seeking power. There is also something which can be described as feeling of solidarity between nations occupied in the past by Russia. Such nations understand each other in some matters without words.* All these created an exceptionally good soil for Afghan influences. Development of events in Tajikistan has been also to some extent similar to that in Afghanistan as Russia protects militarily a communist government in Dushan-

be. The whole thing, however, goes for much more than democratisation process in Tajikistan and the local struggle between communism and Islam. The main question is clearly the Russian domination in Central Asia.** The newspaper of the Russian Ministry of Defence *Krasnaia Zvezda* pointed out that any attempts of evaluation of events in Tajikistan from point of view of the present ideas on democracy and a right political system of this or that country should be postponed. (Czas, Kraków, 23 July 1993) The present Russian involvement in Tajikistan is certainly crucial for continuation of Afghan unofficial attempts to help Tajik people in their struggle.

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* There are, for instance, clearly some psychological similarities between the Afghan attempts to influence the democratisation process in Tajikistan and the former attempts of the Polish underground opposition to help some nations existing within Soviet Union to win democracy. Poles not only used to help Afghans during the war inside Afghanistan but I know about some Polish opposition attempts, among many others, to organize a forum for a meeting between a very active Afghan intellectual in exile and a representative of Tajik intellectual opposition from Tajikistan, even before the USSR collapsed, which led, as far as I know, to a future cooperation.

** Some commentators go even further suggesting that Tajikistan might become the northern part of Afghanistan or it might be Tajikistan which would annex the northern Tajik part of Afghanistan.

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ZYGMUNT PUCKO

A PHILOSOPHICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE AFGHAN (PASHTUN) CODE OF HONOUR

Ethos expresses the hierarchy of values and model of behaviour of a given community. Often ethos was expressed in the form of codes setting out the ideal of moral principles. From them developed the theoretical discipline called ethics which attempts to establish according to which criteria something ought to be or not be done. Although codes of moral behaviour can be found in many cultures, not many of them reached the degree of moral consciousness that for example the Pashtun code achieved*.

Long before the relatively late attempts to write down the Pashtun Code of Honour, its principles were being strictly observed by the Pashtuns and passed on through oral tradition to new generations. The value of this particular code for philosophical ethics is based on the fact that the moral duties set out in it, in no way belittle the universal truths; on the contrary, they emphasise their significance. The ideal of moral behaviour is not attained by means of commands, interdictions or injunctions, but rather through the realisation of moral duty, which, among the Pashtun community has a very concrete meaning. Moral duty permeates many aspects of life including language among others. Language often expresses the manner of being of a Pashtun. The meaning and deep symbolism of many objects such as for example *tura* (sword), or *tizha* (stone), is inherent in their language. Language not only fulfils the function of expressing duty or its reflex, but also objectivises numerous individual moral experiences, expressed in the form of qualifying clauses containing the predicative expression *should*. Obligational clauses are vested in a specific character which resolves itself into the single expression of a certain duty. Over and above this, obligatory clauses refer only to rational beings, obliging them to undertake a given action. Keeping the above in mind, the moral duty in the Pashtun Code of Honour becomes fact. Therefore, the empirical orientation of the ethical model contained in the Code should reach the very source, or the cradle of all ethical dilemmas, namely to the moral consciousness of a Pashtun which can be isolated into several states. The essence of these states differs greatly from the other convictions held by a Pashtun as they communicate to him what action should or should not be taken. For example: a Pashtun should avoid those matters and things which bring discredit to personal dignity; a Pashtun should fulfil his moral dues; a Pashtun should not resort to intrigue or lies etc.