

dēbahr <dyp'hl> 'anger', either for *spihr* <spyyhl> 'sphere, firmament, etc.' or *spaxr* <sp'hl> 'merrymaking, revelry'²²). Not only does the 'dot' not play the role of a diacritic here, but there is also no other feature which could help us to distinguish them. Thus, from the point of view of the writing system alone, there is in fact one sign -  and a separate one , which, of course, can be ambiguous in the light of comparison with some other related script, but this is not the case.

Quite a reverse problem is to be found in the Latin alphabet. We have the letters <u> and <v> which are historically just variant forms of the same letter, without any difference in 'meaning' between them. Despite their common origin nobody considers them any more to be one letter, as the differences in what they denote were introduced in most of the orthographies based on the Latin alphabet.

5. Let us systematise our conclusions now:

- In the case of some pairs of BP letters the 'dotted line ending' has the distinctive power and thus, has to be considered a diacritic. It usually differentiates the letter  from some other sign.
- On some occasions the same element is not used as a diacritic, and - if no other method is applied - some traditionally distinguished signs possess in fact the same graphical form. Thus, certain signs, which are traditionally treated separately, are not differentiated in any way, and so should not be classified as separate letter forms in a synchronic analysis.
- On the whole, the traditional attitude towards the BP script calls for revision, especially at the theoretical level.

²² D. N. MacKenzie, *A Concise...*, pp. 164, 26; 76.

JAN-PETER HARTUNG

A CONTRIBUTION OF ISLAMIC 'REVIVALISTS' TO MODERNITY: THE *Ġamā'at-i islāmī*¹ AS A PRACTICAL APPROACH FOR THE REALIZATION OF AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF HISTORY

In the years after the collapse of the major representatives of the socialist bloc, the phenomenon of 'fundamentalism' has become increasingly a subject of investigation for the social sciences. The dominating motive to which all others can be understood as subordinate seems to be the incompatibility of the normatives set by Western tradition and some non-Western models of explanation competing for universal validity. As a reaction to the theories on the basis of the European Enlightenment, „... man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity, which is to use one's understanding without guidance from another [...]”², are religiously founded concepts, which only now are considered as serious competitors.

The crisis of Western Modernity has been revealed by the failure of the most radical attempt so far to implement such a theory, which puts itself explicitly in the tradition of intellectual Modernity and which even understands itself as the culmination of every social theory based on the epistemological paradigms of occidental natural sciences.³ The existential confrontation of today with other complex systems of explanation which do not tend to an unlimited optimism concerning human understanding under the premise of the Cartesian „cogito ergo sum” has created different patterns of explanation within Modernity. Some of them are derived from the Hegelian philosophy of history, for example FUKUYAMA's theory of *Global Liberalization*⁴. Others underline, based on a reception of Nietzsche's theory of *Power*, the antagonism of differently founded concepts like HUNTINGTON's theory of *Cultural Confrontation*⁵. Nevertheless, all those schemes have one thing in common: they are entirely constituted by the normative ideas of Modernity.

We must now examine to what extent these ideas are applicable in ana-

lyzing cultures^A of different normative foundations. This in turn leads to the problem of whether it is possible to make statements about other cultures, even if the specific hermeneutic background is lacking.

One attempt to solve this dilemma is to examine to what extent the normatives of Western Modernity have been exported (e.g., by colonization of four continents and increasing means of communication), and have merged with originally indigenous normatives to form new concepts. While Western social scientists classify some of these concepts as 'fundamentalist', the supporters of these concepts consider them in total opposition to Western Modernity. This essay tries to show that both are in fact not as antagonistic as they claim to be. Moreover, the non-Western concepts of present times have drawn from their own cultural heritage as well as from the tradition of Western Modernity and thus created an own contribution to a greater idea of Modernity.

The *Ġamā'at-i islāmī*, a political-religious movement which was founded at the eve of British colonial presence in South Asia in 1941 AD, serves as an example confirming the assumptions mentioned above. In this sense, this essay is concerned with one fundamental aspect of the conceptual system of thought of the *Ġamā'at-i islāmī*. This theoretical concept was laid down primarily during the *Ġamā'at*'s consolidating phase between its foundation and the adoption of the first constitution of the *Islamic Republic of Pakistan* in 1956 AD by its founder and *amīr* for more than thirty years, Maulānā Sayyid Abū'l-A'ḷā Maudūdī (1903-1979 AD).⁶ This concept has been most influential in revivalist circles all over the Islamic World.⁷ However, this aspect has hardly been noticed among Western social scientists. Yet, insufficient effort has been made to analyze the confrontation between the ideological system of the *Ġamā'at* and the conceptual terminology of Western intellectual tradition. The present essay, of course, can also not be an all-embracing analysis of the whole terminological framework of the *Ġamā'at*'s ideology^B. But it tries to explain, with the single example of the paradigm

^A Because of all the limitations this draft has to be subjected to, I define *Culture* according to STARK / BAINBRIDGE (*A Theory of Religion*, New Brunswick, NJ., 1996, p. 63): „Culture is the total complex of explanations exchanged by humans.” This definition corresponds with HABERMAS' more detailed communication-theoretical definition (cf. *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne*, Frankfurt/M., 1988) and allows one to consider religion as just one 'cultural system' in a number of systems within a single society. It also seems to show much better the complexity of this term than, for instance, the 'culture' definition given by Max Weber, which seems to have influenced HUNTINGTON as well.

^B In this paper I define *Ideology* as *purposes or aims set by human beings as a necessity given by nature*.

of history and, implicitly, of development, the necessity for deeper research in this particular direction in order to understand the scope and limits of the attempts to investigate a different culture against the hermeneutic background of Western modern thoughts.

a) *Historical Prerequisites: The Common Base*

R. B. HARRIS stresses emphatically the complementarity of long-lasting religions and philosophy.⁸ The latter has always tried to systematize and to interpret the divine revelations and even the supernatural visions of the founders of such religions in terms of rationality as soon as these revelations and visions were completed. In the tradition of the three great monotheistic religions which have emerged from the Middle East, one can find a clear correspondence between the revealed texts and the epistemological criteria of philosophy.

As well as for epistemology, ethics, or simply methodology, the key to Western and Islamic thinking lies in the Alexandrian Neoplatonic School combining Hellenistic rationalism with religiously determined ethical guidelines. Many parallels can be drawn between the theoretical problems as well as their proposed solutions in medieval Christian and Muslim scholastic philosophies: the Plotinian teaching that everything emanates from one single substance came to be the fundamental philosophem in either form of scholasticism. Differences were determined by differences in the fundamental doctrines of faith in both of these religions, especially in their prophetology. In opposition to such 'rationalistic theologies'^C stood, of course, other contemporary philosophical trends which in internal critics turned against certain elements of this rationalism, for instance, scepticism (e.g.: *mu'tazilā*), gnosticism (e.g.: *mutaṣawwufā*), or criticism (e.g.: *aṣ'ariya*).

In Muslim India this Islamic rationalism, which will be considered subsequently as 'classical' and distinguished from an indigenous Indian rationalism from the 17th century AD onward, occurred primarily in the guise of gnosticism mediated by its reception in the Persian culture. Especially the

^C This terminology is taken from Sa'ida IQBĀL (*Islamic Rationalism in the Subcontinent*, Lahore 1984, p. 2) who defined 'rationalism' by reverting to a combination of the Aristotelian definition of *rhetoric* in „Analytica priora” [24b] and „Topica” [100a] and his teaching of the *prima causa* in „Metaphysica” [Book IV]:

„In a general sense, any explanation is a rational explanation, but, in particular, rationalism is an application of reason in answering questions about the ultimate nature of reality. 'Rationalism' then is the name of a methodology; a metaphysical position and a view of the reality.”

pantheistic *al-waḥdat al-wuḡūd*-teaching of Mūḥy' d-dīn Muḥammad Ibn 'Arabī (d. 1240 AD) became quite influential in the development of Muslim thought in India.⁹ Because Islamic thinking on the Indian Subcontinent was spread on the first hand by members of the Čištīya-*ṭarīqa*¹⁰ it is quite understandable that the works of Islamic scholasticism have, over a long period of time and in comparison to those of the mystics, gone relatively unnoticed.¹¹

b) The Break and the Rationalist Reaction

The break in the mutual intellectual tradition of Christianity and Islam arose from different external developments, including, the destruction of most of the classical centers of learning in the Islamic World by the Mongols and the gradual emancipation of the bourgeoisie in medieval Europe. The latter had its theoretical foundation in the Lutheran reformation, which established, by means of Luther's translation of the Bible, the new conceptual key-term *vocation* [*Beruf*], that led to the introversion and desacralization of religion.¹² This again led to the emancipation of the subject from the whole of creation to confront itself with the realm of objects from which it draws its concepts of the world.

From this newly created dichotomy resulted the new philosophical concept of *Freedom* [*Freiheit*]. This idea has since dominated Western philosophical thought, from the Enlightenment by way of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, Kant, Fichte and Schelling until today.

In the meantime a different concept of political power was established in India by the Moḡuls; a concept that HARDY named *Patrimonialism* by, following Max Weber's terminology. It is characterized by a concentration of any right of disposal in the hands of the monarch over the hierarchical ordered subjects who form with their monarch a 'society on agreement' by acknowledging his power as legitimate.¹³ This concept, as a principle of legitimation, reached its peak during the reign of Šāh 'Abd ul-faṭḥ Ġalāl ud-dīn Akbar (1542-1602 AD) glorifying himself as *ḥalīfa*, the maintainer of the universal validity claiming revealed divine order. In the same moment he strategically tried to combine the normative tradition of Islam with indigenous religious, social, and legal traditions for the purpose of consolidating his power. He always reasoned by appealing to the need for the maintenance of universal harmony and wholeness, minimizing differences between religions.

According to Islamic understanding this claim is only possible to realize in strict accordance with the *šarī'a*. The rule of the prophet Muḥammad was

held to be the ideal prototype of this realization. With the proclamation of his own eclecticistic religion called '*dīn-i illāhī*' in 1582 AD, Akbar obviously, in the eyes of the '*ulamā*', broke with the primary implications of Qur'ān and Sunna, concerning for example the position of the ruler with respect to God, ritual aspects, or the characteristics attributed to God.¹⁴ This led to the emergence of a new rationalist-theological reaction, foremost among the politically very active Naqšbandīya-*ṭarīqa*, to whose tradition Maulānā Sayyid Abū'l-A'ḷā Maudūdī centered himself. The first important figure in this trend was Šaiḥ Aḥmad Farūqī Sirhindī (1564-1624 AD) whose internal criticism on religious circumstances is considered to be the first Indian rationalist work, comparable even to the critical work of Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ġazālī (1058-1111 AD).¹⁵

c) Concepts of History in European Modernity

The tension between Akbar's politically motivated religious eclecticism and Aḥmad Sirhindī's criticism, which was oriented on the absolute truth determined by divine revelation, formed the crucial point in the cultural development of Islam in India. From here three traditions emerged which all drew from the great rationalist heritage. These traditions analyzed Islam in the following centuries in India, brought on internal critique, and showed ways out of the crisis.¹⁶

All three traditions have continued until the present; their unifying element is the problem of ethnicity: the search for criteria of Indo-Muslim identity in dissociation from other socio-religious groups. A. S. AHMED applied E. GELLNER's extension of David Hume's pendulum-theory and thus offers a quite useful scheme for including all three traditions.¹⁷

The pendulum, swinging between two antagonistic extremes, points to a cyclic development in Islam, wherein every stagnation reacts by means of critique in a regress to the opposite.

An objection against this theory seems to be that it, of course, requires a paradigm of development such as the Hegelian, assuming a purpose in history. It looks as if those two poles require each other to guarantee development in an evolutionary sense. But Modernity offers by using HABERMAS' subsuming term *Counter-Enlightenment* [*Gegenaufklärung*]¹⁸ another way to view history: Nietzsche's *Philosophy of Origin* [*Ursprungsphilosophie*]. It is worthwhile to briefly examine this model. According to Nietzsche human reason is tied by nature to *Interest*, or *Power* [*Macht*]. This view destroys the Hegelian as well as every other rationalistic paradigm of cognition, because reason is not alienated from itself but from its origin, its origin

being an instinctive, irrational *Will for Power* [*Wille zur Macht*], which is the motivating force for the primary principle, *Life*. It was the dominance of this *a priori*-*'Power'*-principle in times of cultural ascendancy which helped the pure culture to overcome degenerated forms and to continue its dominance; this principle is in times of cultural crises (like the one Nietzsche perceived during his own lifetime) oppressed by ideas produced by the human intellect.¹⁹ In the great theme of cultural revival lies Nietzsche's romantically inspired conception of history, in the recollection of the pure manifestation of the archaic principle of life which is symbolized in a new Dionysus-myth.

In this outline the absolute rationalism of the modern age equals not an *End of History*, but rather the human beings' most serious alienation from their own 'superhistorical' nature which has to be overcome without being regressive: „This *utopian* attitude, which points towards the God *yet to come*, distinguishes the Nietzsche's undertaking from the reactionary call 'Back to the roots'.”²⁰

d) Critical Analysis in Islamic Context

As can be seen, the concepts of history in Western Modernity are tightly connected to epistemological discussions which were initiated mainly by Kant's critique concerning human understanding. It is thus not surprising that modern arguments of a normatively given Islamic view on history started with a critical analysis of existing epistemologies as well.

This started with al-Ġazālī, who criticized the prevalent theories of knowledge methodically^D as well as regarding content^E in a way that was predominant even into the 20th century AD; the most influential modern Indo-Muslim thinker Muḥammad Iqbāl characterized the works of al-Ġazālī as „...almost as apostolic like that of Kant in Germany of the eighteenth century.”²¹ Moreover Šaiḥ Aḥmad Sirhindī and his successors followed al-Ġazālī's criticism, as they all likewise were brought up in times of social, political, and cultural decline. At the end of the Mogul-period, Quṭb ud-dīn 'Abd ur-raḥīm 'Šāh Walī'l-ullāh' Dihlawī (~1702-1762 AD) established, on the basis of his critical rationalism, the first and even nowadays most influential all-embracing system of Islamic thought in India, to which the 'Reform-Orthodoxy' as well as the 'Liberal Modernists' refer alike.

^D e. g. in: „al-Munqid min aḏ-ḏalāl”

^E e. g. in: „Tahāfut al-falāsifa” and: „Iḥyā' 'ulūm ad-dīn”

About one hundred years later, the bloody close of the 'Great Sepoy Mutiny' (1857 AD) on one hand and the trend of growing westernization among the Muslim élites on the other caused once again a critical reaction. Around 1860 AD, a group of '*ulamā*' under the leadership of Maulānā Muḥammad Qāsim Nānautawī (1833-1877 AD) and Maulānā Rašīd Aḥmad Gangauhī (1829-1905 AD) founded in Deoband/ U.P. a religious college, the 'Dār ul-'ulūm', which up to our days understands itself explicitly as the practical realization of the spiritual heritage of 'Šāh Walī'l-ullāh'.²²

More than others, Nānautawī radicalized his critique concerning human understanding of sensualism [*maḥsūsīya*], materialism [*daharīya*], and speculative Cartesian-style rationalism [*ma'qūlīya*]. He did this by marginalizing the differences between their epistemological paradigms and unifying them '*Deobandīya*'-school of thought, that was spread all over the Subcontinent, in which the introverted experience of the divine [*ma'rifa*] became central, as one can find already in al-Ġazālī's „Iḥyā' 'ulūm ad-dīn”.²³

The '*Deobandīya*'-movement stood in open opposition to the spirit of the 'Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College' of 'Alīgarḥ/ U.P., which was established in 1875 AD by 'Sir' Sayyid Aḥmad Ḥān which tried to be a synthesis of western Pragmatism and the cultural values of Islam.

'Alīgarḥ was also a result of the educated élites' search for a genuine identity for Indian Muslims, produced by their culturally and politically unstable situation after the 'Great Mutiny'. All have in common the view that the creation of self-confidence, and thus identity, is only possible by reforming the educational system.

In Europe, a similar development occurred not only by chance: if one follows Hegel, a crisis of thought must succeed a crisis of time.²⁴

The new knowledge of the natural sciences in Post-Napoleonic Europe had been a necessary base for the 'Industrial Revolution' and thus for the export of Modernity to the colonies. But it led, on the other hand, to a gradually heightened relationship between the bourgeoisie and aristocracy and therefore demanded a revised foundation of *Weltanschauung*, and thus of society. Affected by the natural sciences' optimism concerning human understanding, the Neo-Kantians claimed to have purged the Kantian critical philosophy of all speculative accessories; hence philosophy became a pure epistemology.

Accordingly, metaphysics became associated with the past, a destructive philosophy of the aristocracy, and thus the subject to the so-called 'Counter-Enlightenment' or 'Postmodernity' which was dominated by the philosophies of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and also by the Hermeneutics of Friedrich Schleiermacher.

Both approaches have found their modified equivalents among the Indian Muslims since the middle of the 19th century AD.. The Neo-Kantian epistemology is represented by the *Islamic Pragmatism* of Sayyid Aḥmad Ḥān and his epigones, for the metaphysical reaction stood *Deobandīyat* and every school of thought associated with it. Both were attempts to solve one and the same social and intellectual crisis by means of different interpretations of the relation between objective reality and subjective usefulness, which again determines different premises for each interpretation of reality.

But this practically orientated demand led to the two interpretations as ideologies, which in turn led finally to a heightening of tension within the Muslim community in India and to the weakening of the Muslim community with respect to external communities. In this situation, conciliatory approach was required to mediate in the dispute between Social Modernism and a Muslim identity which can only be justified by traditional means. In the time that followed, the work of Muḥammad Šāh Iqbāl (1873-1938 AD) came comparatively closest to this aim.

With his work „The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam” (1925 AD), written in English, Iqbāl provided for the first time a philosophical foundation of modern Muslim identity by means of an explicit discussion of modern western philosophies.²⁵ In doing so he became a key figure in the Islamic contribution to the project of intellectual Modernity claiming universal validity. He introduced the still relevant discussion of different Western schemes of reasoning within modernist as well as traditionalist circles, because the prerequisites as well as these western models themselves had found entrance into Non-European cultures, mainly by the mediation of the European colonial regimes.

e) Maudūdī's Paradigm of History as the Traditionalist-Ideological Aspect of Iqbāl's Religious-Philosophical 'Reconstructivism'

Like the 'All-India Muslim League', established in 1906 AD, also Maulānā Abū'l-A'īlā Maudūdī, and his 'school', were implicitly as well as explicitly influenced by the works of the late Muḥammad Iqbāl.²⁶

It seems that some clues exist which would even allow the conclusion that the differences in the works of both towards 'Reconstruction'^F may merely be understood as just two sides of the same coin.

^F The term 'Reconstruction' is drawn from Iqbāl's epistemological major work „The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam”. It should be understood as identical with HUNTINGTON's term 'Islamic Resurgence' (cf. note 4).

From a theoretical point of view, both critically analyzed the situation of the Indian Muslims in the period which immediately preceded the partition of the country at the close of British colonial presence, and both equally related this situation to the implications of the normative sources of Islam.


Both sought to free the roots of Muslim identity within its specific territorial frame, but also remembering perfectly Islam's claim for unlimited spatial and temporal validity, and both, although setting different priorities, analyzed the situation from the intellectual as well as from the definite historical point of view. For this they used a paradigm of history^G which is based on a prophetic tradition [*ḥadīṣ*] and which could be described as follows: a development which, starting from the definite historical ideal state, enters (by renunciation of these normative implications justifying the ideal state) cyclically into intellectual and political crises. These crises will in turn be resolved by one or more personalities who analyzes the particular crisis for the community and admonishes it to repent. This paradigm is called '*tağdīd*', 'renewal' or 'restauration', and is founded upon *ḥadīṣ* 1 in the „Kitāb al-malāḥim” of the „Sunnan Abū Dā'ūd”:

„Sulaimān b. Dā'ūd am-Mahrī handed down to us: 'Ibn Wahab has narrated that Sa'id b. Abū Ayyūb had told from Šarāḥīl b. Yazīd al-Mu'afīrī, from Abū 'Alqama, and from Abū Huraira, who came to know that the messenger of God - prayer be on him and peace - says: 'Indeed, God sends this community on the begin of each century one who restores their religion.' ...”²⁷

In their different ways of dealing with this paradigm, it seems possible to illustrate the respective stances of Iqbāl and Maudūdī within their joint project, 'Reconstruction of Religious Thought'.

Iqbāl, who had studied intensively the philosophies of European Modernity during his three-year study trip in Germany, directed his critique of understanding towards his philosophical opponents in the West as well as to the self-described 'enlightened' Muslims of the 'Alīgarh-tradition. For this, he presupposed the ideal subject of the European Enlightenment: the free, responsible, and thus 'sensible' man who possesses the ability „... to compare and to keep together given ideas either with other or with his own can-

^G Iqbāl referred to this paradigm only implicitly in Chapter 5 and 6 of „The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam”, but he included in his historical analysis nearly all personalities which Maudūdī extensively discussed as *muğaddidīn* in Chapter 3 of his programmatic work „Tağdīd wa iḥyā'-yi dīn” (1940 AD).



capacity of understanding with respect to an idea, which thus only became possible [...]”²⁸, and thus possess the ability to judge independently [*iğtihād*].

This can be proved by the formal fact, that the major part of his works is written in Persian or English, the languages of the élites, as well as by criteria regarding content.

Maudūdī's proposition, however, was the dichotomy of constant search for meaning by human beings, which is manifested in the creation of metaphysical systems of interpretation and his limited ability to judge, for which reason the Creator of the universe revealed to him by way of the prophets the way in which the world has to be interpreted. The recognition of this interpretation and the attempt to understand it rationally as well as emotionally is named 'knowledge' [*ilm*], while its rejection or its subordination under human-made schemes of interpretation is understood by Maudūdī as 'ignorance' or 'denial' [*ğahiliyat*].

The duty of the knowing man is, especially in times of internal crises, to draw up a program of reforms [*iślāh kī tağwīz*] on the basis of Qur'ān and Sunna by means of a critical analysis of the spatial and temporal concrete situation [*apne ma-ḥūl ṣaḥīḥ taṣḥīṣ*]. He should then propagate this program to the ignorant, and should be committed to its practical realization: an Islamic renaissance [*iḥyā'-yi nizām-i islām*] after the pattern of the prophet's state in al-Madīna.²⁹ These are all implications of the *tağdīd*-paradigm which Maudūdī deduced from the above quoted *ḥadīṣ*. The fundamental criterion for him was the unlimited recognition of the normative texts and the strict refusal of any kind of innovation [*tağaddud*], which means a synthesis of different human-made schemes of interpretation with the divine system *Islām*.

It seems as if Iqbāl's application of the *tağdīd*-paradigm was in the first place a discussion of those worldviews which came into being from outside the Islamic culture as a result of human speculation and which led, mediated by colonization of the Islamic cultural area, to 'Innovation' inside the Islamic system. Maudūdī, on the other hand, paid more attention rather to these 'innovative forms' and their consequences within his own culture; however, he needed the extrinsic analysis of Iqbāl for his own intrinsic analysis.

Maudūdī saw himself, though not explicitly, as belonging to the tradition of the *muğaddidīn* which he discussed. These were 1) 'Umar b. 'Abd al-azīz (~677-720 AD); 2) the founder of the four most important law schools [*a'mma-yi arb'a*]: Abū Ḥanīfa (699-767 AD), Abū 'Abd-allāh aṣ-Ṣāf'ī (767 - 854 AD), Mālik b. Anās (714 - 798 AD), and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (780 - 855 AD); 3) Abū Ḥamid al-Ğazālī; 4) Ibn Taimīya (1263-1328 AD); 5) Ṣaiḥ Aḥmad Sirhindī; and 6) 'Šāh Walī'l-ullāh' Dihlawī.³⁰

He followed the traditionalist way by drawing all his reformatory thoughts from the axioms of the normative sources; for this reason he tried hard to understand these texts even further. This could be derived from the fact that he used the greater part of his active life to translate the Qur'ān into Urdū and to provide it with a *tafsīr*, his „Tafḥīm ul-qur'ān”,³¹ which, according to M. AHMAD, is nowadays most popular commentary in Pakistan.³²

That is why one will look in vain for obvious logical arguments of his statements in the fashion of the rationalists. In contrast to the works of the above mentioned *muğaddidīn*, all of Maudūdī's arguments are normative statements or derivatives from Qur'ān and Sunna which are not ordered logically in relation to the present, but coagulated into an ideology. That is the reason why the works of Maudūdī must be called rather 'popular', contrasting Iqbāl who raised the same analysis on a metaphysical level and reasoned logically, though he did not deliver a concrete practical concept as Maudūdī tried to do.

Following the above given definition of 'ideology' (cf. fn. b), it is possible to reason ideologically on the *tağdīd*-paradigm Maudūdī's idea, how, from his own perspective of the present, the ideal condition of the past could be reached in the future in an up-to-date manner. It is thus also possible to come full circle with the paradigms of history of Western Modernity to understand Maudūdī in the same way as Iqbāl, as a thinker of a greater idea of Modernity, and to fit in his ideology from the reflexive viewpoint of the past as well as of his lifetime in terms of the history of ideas.

The key role herein uses Maudūdī's concept of the 'Perfect Renewer' [*muğaddid-i kāmīl*], of the *Imām ul-mahdī*.

„The place of the Perfect Renewer is yet still empty, but the reason knows it, nature demands it, and the development of worlds condition requires it, that such a 'leader' will be born, whether he will be born in this time or [just] be born after thousands of courses of epochs.

His name will be 'ul-Imām ul-mahdī', about which there exist already clear prophecies in the sayings of the prophet - prayer be on him and peace.”³³

This quotation reveals quite clearly the ideological content in this conception of Maudūdī. It refers to the immediately approaching Islamic eschatology, a momentum which is typical for religious analysts of crises. That seems quite comprehensible in the face of the developments in Western natural sciences and politics witnessed by Maudūdī and Iqbāl.³⁴ But while Iqbāl reasoned rationally that Islam is the best of all possible options,

Maudūdī assumed that Islam is the only possibility to overcome existing schisms:

„At the end, the fifth stage of the prophecy, all constellations direct to the fact that the history of mankind with [full] speed heads towards it. All man-made 'Isms' have readily been tried out and for the most part do not work. For man remains, now he is upset, no other opportunity then to return to Islam.”³⁵

In this context, there is one important feature concerning Maudūdī's application to the *Imām ul-mahdī* and which is obviously not based on a normative or even traditional ground:

„My assumption is, that the coming one will be a leader of most modern fashion in his epoch. He will possess the discerning insight into all modern fields of knowledge over his time ... and over all modern people of his age this man will just reach highest praise.”³⁶

Here there seems to be an obvious parallel to Nietzsche's messianic *Principle of the Dionysian*: The Sacred, which unifies everything and everybody, will be reborn from the debris of reason-made schisms.

„The tragic understanding...” of the limitations of science „..., on which its own optimism, that is hidden in the nature of logic, fails [...]”³⁷ leads to a resuscitation of the original myth applying itself to the modern external conditions of the 'here and now'. In this respect, it is thus at least possible to understand an important part of Maudūdī's theoretical work in the context of a Modernity with universal claim.

But Maudūdī's emphasis lies, in opposition to Nietzsche and to Iqbāl, on the practical realization³⁸ of the renewal-idea by means of continuing efforts in strict correspondence with the normative implications [*ḡihād*],³⁹ because for him the idea of a natural necessity of *taḡdīd* is justified almost by its own by the difference of the 'debit'-standardization of the Qur'ān and the spatial and temporal concrete 'credit'-state.

To grasp this difference, he needs no establishment of a logical relation between these two states, but rather a separate analysis of each of them, and practical concepts for their mediation.

NOTES

¹ Transcription according to the guidelines of the „German Oriental Society” for the Arabic alphabet in Persian and Turkish contexts (Halle/S., 1934), for the sake of clarity and uniformity also in Arabic contexts.

² I. KANT „Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist *Aufklärung*?”, A418: „... *Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit, sich seines Verstandes ohne Leitung zu bedienen* [...]” [trans. by J.- P. HARTUNG].

³ Cf. e. g. W. I. LENIN, *Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus*, Moskau 1947 (1908), p. 140.

⁴ Cf. F. FUKUYAMA, *The End of History*, New York 1992, c. 4.

⁵ Cf. S. P. HUNTINGTON, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York 1996.

⁶ Cf. A. MAUDŪDĪ, *Ġamā'at-i islāmī kā maqṣad, tāriḥ aur lā'ihā-yi 'amal*, Lāhor 1996 AD (1951 AD), pp. 26f., 39, 54.

⁷ Cf. A. MEIER, *Der politische Auftrag des Islam*, Wuppertal 1994, pp. 185f.

⁸ Cf. R. B. HARRIS, *Preface* [in:] P. MOREWEDGE, *Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought*, New York 1992, p. vii.

⁹ Cf. A. SCHIMMEL, *Der Islam im indischen Subkontinent*, Darmstadt 1995 (1983), pp. 32, 39, 121.

¹⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 11f.

¹¹ Cf. S. IQBAL, *Islamic Rationalism in the Subcontinent*, Lahore 1984, p. 53.

¹² Cf. M. WEBER, *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* [in:] *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religions-soziologie*, Vol. 1, Reprint, Tübingen 1988 (1920), p. 69.

¹³ Cf. P. HARDY, *Islamischer Patrimonialismus: Die Mogulherrschaft* [in:] W. SCHLUCHTER (Ed.), *Max Webers Sicht des Islam*, Frankfurt/M. 1987, pp. 190-217; cf. M. WEBER, *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen* [in:] *ibid.*, pp. 261ff.

¹⁴ Cf. *id.*, *Religious Tension under the Mughals* [in:] DeBARY (Ed.), *Sources of Indian Traditions*, New York 1960, pp. 438, 443.

¹⁵ Cf. S. IQBAL, *loc. cit.*, p. 53.

¹⁶ Cf. A. S. AHMED, *Islam, Ethnicity and the State: Models of Political Leadership among South Asian Muslims* [in:] M. GABORIEAU, *Islam et Société en Asie du Sud*, Paris 1986, p. 155.

¹⁷ Cf. *ibid.*; E. GELLNER, *Der Islam als Gesellschaftsordnung*, [trans. by S. ENDERWITZ] Stuttgart 1995, pp. 126ff.

¹⁸ Cf. J. HABERMAS, *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne*, Frankfurt/M. 1996 (1988), pp. 11ff.

¹⁹ Cf. F. NIETZSCHE, *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen. Zweites Stück*. [in:] C. COLLI / M. MONTENARI (eds.), *Kritische Studienausgabe*, Vol. 1, p. 274.

²⁰ J. HABERMAS, *loc. cit.*, p. 108: „*Diese utopische Einstellung, die sich auf den kommenden Gott richtet, unterscheidet Nietzsches Unternehmung vom reaktionären Ruf 'Zurück zu den Ursprüngen'.*” [trans. by J.- P. HARTUNG].

²¹ M. IQBAL, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Reprint, Lahore 1996 (1925), p. 12.

²² Cf. Q. M. TAYYĪB, *Muqaddima* [in:] S. M. RIDWĪ, *Tārīḥ-i Dār ul-'ulūm-i Deoband*, Vol. 1, Deoband 1992 AD (1976 AD), p. 11.

²³ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 24f.; G.-H. BOUSQUET, *Ghazâlî. Ih'ya 'Oulûm ed-Dîn ou Vivification des sciences de la Foi. Analyse et index*, Paris 1955, pp. 61ff.

²⁴ Cf. G. W. F. HEGEL, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Berlin 1981 (1833), Einleitung (pp. 29-70).

²⁵ Cf. M. IQBAL, *op. cit.*, pp. 33ff.

²⁶ Cf. A. MAUDŪDĪ, *Iqbāl-'ahd-sāz šaḥsīyat* (1963 AD) [in:] H. HUMAYŪN, (ed.), *Iqbālīyāt*, Dehli 1986 AD, p. 25; *id.*, *Ġamā'at-i islāmī ke 29 sāl*, Reprint, Lāhore 1997 AD (1970 AD), p. 22.

²⁷ SUNNAN ABŪ DĀ'ŪD, *Kitāb am-mālaḥim*, ḥ. 1, Vol. 2, Baīrūt 1988 AD, p. 512 [trans. *id.*] (Maudūdī quoted this *ḥadīṣ* but without *isnād* in: „Taḡdīd wa iḥyā'-yi dīn”, Reprint, Dehli 1994 AD (1940 AD), pp. 39f.).

²⁸ I. KANT, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, Einleitung der Ersten Fassung, MS, H17: „... gegebene Vorstellungen entweder mit anderen, oder mit seinem Erkenntnißvermögen, in Beziehung auf einen dadurch möglichen Begriff, zu vergleichen und zusammen zu halten [...]” [trans. *id.*].

²⁹ Cf. A. MAUDŪDĪ, *cit. op.*, p. 45.

³⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 52-105.

³¹ Cf. Kh. AHMAD / Z. I. ANSARI, *Mawlana Mawdudī. An Introduction to his Life and Thought*, Reprint, Delhi 1992 (1979), p. 15.

³² Cf. M. AHMAD, *Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat of South Asia* [in:] M. E. MARTY / R. S. APPLEBY, (eds.), *Fundamentalisms Observed*, Chicago 1991, p. 468.

³³ A. MAUDŪDĪ, *loc. cit.*, p. 46 [trans. *id.*].

³⁴ Cf. M. IQBĀL, *loc. cit.*, pp. 7f.

³⁵ A. MAUDŪDĪ, *loc. cit.*, p. 48, fn. 1 [trans.: *id.*].

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 49f. [trans.: *id.*].

³⁷ F. NIETZSCHE, *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, [in:] *loc. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 101: „Die tragische Erkenntnis ..., ... an denen ihr im Wesen der Logik verborgener Optimismus scheitert [...]” [trans. *id.*].

³⁸ This thesis seems to be confirmed by Sayyid As'ad GILĀNĪ's analysis on the respective conception of the subject of Maudūdī and Iqbāl („Ġamā'at-i islāmī 1941' tā 1947'”, Lāhore 1996 AD, p. 88): „The 'Man with confidence in God' [*mard-i mū'min*] of Maulānā Maudūdī becomes obvious in the shape of an active subject of Iqbāl's suggested and theoretical subject.” [trans. *id.*].

³⁹ Cf. A. MAUDŪDĪ, *Ġamā'at-i islāmī ke 29 sāl*, p. 14, fn. 1.

ANNA KRASNOWOLSKA

ŠAB-E ČELLE

The beginning of winter is a moment of particular importance in Iranian popular time reckoning. The first day of the first winter month Dey, equal to the date of winter solstice, in Iranian folklore is the beginning of Čelle-ye Bozorg („The Great Forty”) - a period which includes the first forty days of winter.¹ That is why the eve of the first day of winter is commonly known as Šab-e Čelle - the Čelle Night.

Čelle-ye Bozorg ends on the 10th of Bahman, the date of the pre-Islamic fire festival, Sade. The festival has been generally forgotten today, although some of its customs and magic practices survived in the Iranian countryside. According to popular time computation, the Great Čelle is immediately followed by the Small one (Čelle-ye Kuček) which lasts only twenty days i.e. until the end of Bahman. On the first of Esfand, the closing date of Čelle-ye Kuček, a semi-vernal festival is held in some parts of Iranian world (Central Iran in particular, but also some places in Tajikistan)². Esfand, the last winter month, may be considered an intermediary stage between winter and spring. Regular spring begins with the festival of Nouruz, on the first of Farvardin equal to the vernal equinox.

Old sources (chiefly Biruni and his followers)³ testify to the existence of a pre-Islamic Iranian festival falling around the winter solstice. Several Zo-

¹ see: A. Krasnowolska, *Some Key Figures of Iranian Calendar Mythology*, Kraków 1998, 51 ff.

² S.H. Taqizadeh, „Old Iranian Calendars Again”, *BSOAS* 14/2, 610; A.Q. Enjavi-ye Širāzi, *Jašnā va aqāyed-o mo'taqedāt-e zemestān*, Tehrān 1352-4 (1973-5), I: 29-53, 86-106; II: 28-77, 152-69; Muxiddinov, „Narodnyj zemledel'českij kalendar' pamiorskix tadžikov”, *Pamirovedenie* I, Dušanbe 1984, 158-9.

³ Al-Bīrūnī, *Kitāb al-āṭār al-bāqīya: Chronologie orientalischer Völker*, ed. C.E. Sachau, Leipzig 1923, 225-6 (later on referred to as *Chronology*); *id.* *Al-Qānūn al-Mas'ūdī*, Hyderabad 1954, I, 264; Gardizi, *Zeyno-l-axbār* ed. Habibi, [Tehrān] 1347 (1968), 245; Qazvini, *Ajāyeb-o-l-maxluqāt*, ed. N. Sabuhi, [Tehrān] 1361 (1982), 79-80.