Runtime assurance of language-model-based systems: from safety monitors to certification-ready evidence

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24425/ijet.2026.6345

Abstract

Language models are entering systems whose failures matter: vehicles, industrial toolchains, and autonomous agents acting on real infrastructure. At the same time, emerging regulation and safety standards demand not merely safe behavior but evidence of it that a third party can re-check. This survey traces a single architectural idea across three decades of research: an untrusted, powerful component is guarded at runtime by a small, verifiable one, and every intervention leaves evidence. We follow the idea from proof-carrying code, the Simplex architecture, and shielding for learned agents, through runtime monitors for neural components, to its present forms: generate and-verify systems in which a symbolic engine certifies every step of a model’s output, and runtime guardrails that enforce policies over language-model agents. We synthesize a spectrum of verification strength, from statistical judgment to kernel checked proof, analyze which strength each application class and regulatory obligation requires, and identify the open problem of assurance over large, versioned factual world models.

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Published

2026-10-29

How to Cite

Essam, Kamal. “Runtime Assurance of Language-Model-Based Systems: From Safety Monitors to Certification-Ready Evidence”. International Journal of Electronics and Telecommunications, vol. 72, no. 4, Oct. 2026, pp. 1-8, doi:10.24425/ijet.2026.6345.

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